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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article outlines some of the moral, legal, and general policy 
difficulties that societies and individuals will face if technological 
enhancements via germ line and somatic mechanisms become possible.  
It identifies and analyzes some of the conceptual structures necessary to 
explain the nature of these difficulties, suggests some alternative basic 
scenarios—such as greater or lesser scarcity of technological enhancement 
resources, impacts on how we perceive each other, and different 
remediation patterns—and then maps and reverse maps the projected 
technological developments against the value and legal structures.  This 
Article also describes and comments on what may seem to be, from our 
present value standpoints, the most critical threats and promises of the 
anticipated changes, and it also inquires into what might be the fate of 
these very standpoints themselves.  The idea of enhancement is 
compared to other processes of human change, principally to the familiar 
forms of self-progress and the practices of treating disorders, injuries, 
and the like.  Questions are raised about the very significance of these 
distinctions as rational authorizing and limiting tools that might guide us 
in distinguishing among permissible and impermissible interventions 
and among obligatory and nonobligatory ones. 
The moral and legal issues are explored primarily by way of the 
concept of equality.  Some of the classic and (possibly) novel difficulties 
in the equality analyses include matters of access to and distribution of 
technological resources; the possibility of increased socioeconomic and 
political stratification that may be irreversible; and the effects of a 
technological enhancement regime on the ways in which we view each 
other (as planned and assembled objects, as persons, or as some blend of 
these or other attitudes?) and on the viability of present ideas of equality 
and its relationship to justice, fairness, autonomy, utility, and ideas of 
merit, virtue, and desert.  The Article also considers whether our notions 
of merit, virtue, and desert might be reconstructed or abandoned.  
Distributional criteria and, more generally, different egalitarian 
arguments based on different visions of equality are sorted.  There is a 
brief exploration of how the structure of our democratic institutions 
might be altered by responses to particular distribution patterns of merit 
attribute enhancements, in particular by adopting a plural voting system 
of the sort envisioned by John Stuart Mill.  Different forms of remediation 
or prevention of inequality and of affirmative promotion of equality are 
briefly discussed.  At the end there is a brief review of some issues 
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arising under the United States Constitution.  If technology changes in 
the ways many anticipate, the acute moral and policy issues will eventually 
be vetted and disputed within the legal system.  The constitutional issues 
that will be raised embed basic political or moral values and serve as 
powerful lenses for appraising some possible futures. 
This Article does not specifically respond at length to the excellent 
discussion in From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice.1  It simply 
presents additional takes on many of the same issues raised in that work.  
Toward the end, this Article offers some suggestions about what issues 
might have been filled out in additional ways.2 
II.  SOME BASIC CONCEPTS 
A.  Mapping Meanings of “Equality” onto Meanings                              
of “Enhancement” and Vice Versa 
To explain how equality may be affected by technological enhancement3 
requires some account of the meaning of enhancement, a review of the 
intimidating complexities of equality analysis, including equality’s 
relationship to other basic values, and an examination of how varying 
understandings of the concepts of enhancement and equality affect each 
other. 
This Article outlines a bidirectional mapping of differing versions of 
equality and projected forms of enhancement against each other.  
Different ideas of equality may lead to different valuations of 
enhancement, and the reverse.  An initial task is to distinguish different 
equality arguments, and this rests, in part, on asking the now-familiar 
question: What is supposed to be equal to what?  An obvious example of 
variant meanings of equality is suggested by the tension between 
equality of opportunity in its several forms4 (certain ex ante positions are 
to be set equal) and equal-outcome standards (certain ex post positions 
are to be set equal).  These opposing pulls are especially vivid when 
considering the possibility of, say, major enhancement of intellectual 
abilities.  Equal opportunity understood as rights against interference by 
others with access to enhancement resources may yield unequal 
 
 1. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 
(2000). 
 2. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 3. Unless otherwise indicated, the term “enhancement” refers to technological 
enhancement, not to familiar forms of self-improvement through study, training, and 
other efforts. 
 4. DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 64–81 (1981) (discussing varying meanings 
of equality and equality of opportunity, including prospect-regarding and means-
regarding forms of equality of opportunity). 
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outcomes that track and intensify existing inequalities in wealth, income, 
status, and power.  Diminishing returns in the value of increments in 
ability may set in slowly, thus prolonging the incentive to continue 
adding increments to intellectual talents, and further deepening inequalities 
in power and social status.  As a given form of enhancement becomes 
widespread, its value to a particular individual may shift from enabling 
her to tower over others to enabling her to avoid being towered over.  
For some traits, then, the more widespread the enhancement, the more 
urgently the less able need it in order to avoid losing more and more ground 
to more and more persons.  At some later stage, relative interpersonal 
positions may be unchanged, although absolute performance capacities 
are amplified.  An equality of outcome standard, on the other hand, 
would require major centralized intervention either to narrow the ability 
gaps among persons or at least to preserve their relative standing.  In the 
latter case, equality of outcome would encompass not flat-out equal 
abilities, but the status quo ante concerning the relative distance between 
persons, rather than perfectly equal abilities.  Of course, egalitarian 
maneuvers might involve redistribution of traditional goods and services, 
either in addition to or instead of enhancement opportunities.5 
 B.  Technological Expectations; Germ Line and                          
Somatic Enhancements 
Current directions in technology clearly justify assuming for argument’s 
sake that we will be able to influence the development of targeted human 
traits and that the outcome may differ significantly from what life’s 
lottery (genetic or environmental) might otherwise have presented.  The 
apparently successful germ line alteration that resulted in superior 
learning ability in mice illustrates the point nicely.6  In earlier experiments, 
 
 5. See generally the extensive discussion in BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1.  A 
detailed examination of alternative forms of equality remediation or inequality 
prevention cannot be pursued here. 
 6. See Ken Howard, Mickey Mouse, PhD: Inserting a Single Gene Makes Mice 
Smarter, 281 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 30 (1999); John Travis, Gene Tinkering Makes 
Memorable Mice . . . , and Hikes Fear and Anxiety in Others, 156 SCIENCE NEWS 149 
(1999).  See also Ya-Ping Tang et al., Genetic Enhancement of Learning and Memory in 
Mice, 401 NATURE 63 (1999) (scientific report).  The authors characterize their findings 
as involving “the age-dependent threshold for synaptic plasticity and memory 
formation,” and conclude that their identification of “a molecular switch in the memory 
process has indicated a potential new target for the treatment of learning and memory 
disorders” and “also reveals a promising strategy for the creation of other genetically 
modified mammals with enhanced intelligence and memory.”  Id. at 68. 
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mouse embryos assimilated rat genes coding for growth hormone, 
producing some large mice that themselves bred several hefty offspring.  
The important point to take from these results is that even complex 
polygenic and multifactorial traits such as intellectual ability or size may 
be heavily influenced by a given gene.7  Not all genes and environmental 
factors are equal—some may have outsize or disproportionate effects.8  
The accompanying reservation, of course, is that similar outcomes in 
human beings may nevertheless be quite far off, if they are even possible 
at all. 
One distinction requires immediate attention—the distinction between 
human germ line and non-germ-line techniques for altering traits in a 
specific possible or existing person.  (Low technology selective breeding 
would alter the distribution of traits in a population but not in a particular 
individual.)  Non-germ-line techniques include genetic alteration of 
somatic (body) cells, known as “gene therapy.”  Such alteration does not 
affect gametes (mishaps aside) and so does not affect one’s descendants.  
Nevertheless, because gene therapy and the development of substances 
directly affecting gene operations require extensive knowledge of 
genetic mechanisms, pursuing these non-germ-line techniques will 
generate knowledge that may be relevant within the realm of germ line 
changes.  These modes of enhancement are mentioned below. 
C.  The Idea of Enhancement9 
1.  In General 
For convenience, the terms “enhancement” and “augmentation” are 
used interchangeably, although they are not precisely synonymous.  
Both are generally distinguished from the terms “extension” or 
 
 7. Fly’s Life Prolonged By a Human Gene, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at A19; 
Thomas H. Maugh II, Genetic Cousins, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at B2 (“Showing that 
a behavior as complex as sexual behavior is controlled by a single gene, at least in flies, 
raises the obvious possibility that other behaviors will be similarly controlled.” (quoting 
Stanford biologist Bruce Baker)). 
 8. At least one report suggests discovery of a gene having a greater effect on 
human general intelligence than do other known genes.  Constance Holden, The First 
Gene Marker For IQ?, 280 SCIENCE 681, 681 (1998). 
 9. See generally ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
(Erik Parens ed., 1998) [hereinafter ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS].   
Note the difficulties in specifying a notion of “equal enhancement.”  Assuming we 
could indeed measure various effects, it is unlikely that any drugs or other agents act 
identically on all persons.  Indeed, it may often be unclear what “identically” could mean 
with respect to any given variable; and it may be at least equally unclear what the all the 
variables are.  The possibility of individually tailored drugs for different persons also 
strains the concept, although one might still posit equal effects generated by different 
drugs tailored to each person. 
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“supplementation” (for example, a springier vaulting pole).  Standing alone, 
the term “enhancement” refers to technological enhancement, not to 
socially and legally accepted processes of self-improvement, such as 
gradually increasing one’s strength by lifting weights, or improving 
one’s analytical skills through study.  Many observers view the results of 
such accepted measures as “internally” rather than “externally” or 
“unnaturally” generated changes; the latter are thought to compromise 
claims of personal, meritorious achievement.  In fact, these varying 
paths toward superior traits will generally be intertwined, further 
complicating our analysis. 
Here are three groups of overlapping questions concerning the concept 
of enhancement.  Who is to be enhanced and why?  What is to be 
enhanced and why?  What counts as enhancement and why? 
2.  What is the Unit of Enhancement? 
We need to ask first who or what is to be enhanced.  A possible 
person presently in the form of an early embryo or as-yet-unjoined 
gametes?  A particular living person or group?  The present or future 
human race?  Altering a specific embryo’s genome should be 
distinguished from preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), where 
embryos are tested to determine whether they bear certain genetic 
predispositions.  An impressive example is the identification of embryos 
that bear the dominant gene for early-onset Alzheimer’s disease.10  In 
this case, no specific individual is enhanced; the cohort of offspring 
following such PGD is affected as a group.  Asking whether this should 
be viewed as enhancement of the cohort reveals the partial 
indeterminacy of the underlying concept: is such avoidance of a 
precipitous decline in intelligence within a group a genetic enhancement 
of the group? 
 
 10. Note the conceptual misdescription in a New York Times article.  Denise 
Grady, Baby Spared Mother’s Fate by Genetic Tests as Embryo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 
2002, at A16.  Of course, the baby wasn’t spared anything; the embryo from which it 
developed was selected because it did not have the offending gene.  No affected embryo, 
from which a person with that gene could develop, was selected for implantation.  See 
also Marian D. Damewood, Ethical Implications of a New Application of 
Preimplantation Diagnosis, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3143 (2001).  For the scientific 
report on the latter, see Yury Verlinsky et al., Preimplantation Diagnosis for Fanconi 
Anemia Combined With HLA Matching, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3130 (2001). 
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3.  What Is Enhanced? 
Traits, attributes, and characteristics are the targets for enhancement, 
but to what do these terms refer?  Behavior patterns?  Cognitive, 
emotional, and other forms of mental functioning?  (It is not always 
clear what enhanced emotional, cognitive, or other states might be.)  Do 
they include physical appearance?  Tissue structure?  Molecular 
arrangements, such as genomic structure, and biochemical processes?  
Competitive performance?  Predispositions to develop particular physical 
or mentational conditions?  And which of these targets should be selected 
for improvement?  What role does culture play in characterizing and 
valuing traits and how might this track genetics?  A culturally valued 
trait may only rarely have a clear genomic correlate. 
4.  What Counts as Enhancement? 
Two of the most discussed issues in enhancement are, first, whether 
and how to distinguish permissible forms of enhancement (practice and 
pumping iron) with impermissible forms (ingesting memory-aiding 
substances, altering the germ line of one’s children, and other 
technological fixes or shortcuts generally); and, second, whether and 
how to distinguish between enhancement, on the one hand, and repair of 
defects, or injuries, or control of disorder, on the other.  As to the latter, 
a major reason for insisting on the treatment versus augmentation 
distinction is the belief that it provides limits on an enhancement 
imperative that might otherwise seem to be utterly unbounded.  Using 
this distinction is not without cost, however.  Among other things, we 
risk devaluing and stigmatizing those with imperfections of various 
sorts.  Moreover, that distinction may simply be descriptively and 
normatively indeterminate in some cases.  In any case, resource 
constraints may impose severe limits on the extent to which the 
treatment model and the enhancement model will be lumped; 
characterizing an alteration as enhancement rather than treatment 
provides at least a loose policy reason for declining to allocate public or 
private resources to finance it.  As to the first distinction—permissible 
versus impermissible enhancements—its defense rests, in part, on an 
uncertain evaluation of the importance of following quite different paths 
to a particular outcome.  Its boundaries may also be descriptively and 
normatively indeterminate in various situations.  Finally, as to the 
outcomes themselves, note again the substantive question of what it 
might mean to say that certain traits—physical or mental—are enhanced; 
the very concept of enhancement may vary across cultures. 
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5.  Enhancement of Merit and Wealth-Attracting Attributes       
(Resource Attractors) 
Traits plainly vary in importance.  Those strongly favored for whatever 
reason—particular abilities, health, appearance, personality, and 
culturally preferred behavioral predispositions—are critical variables 
affecting the distribution of life’s rewards, including social and political 
status, income and wealth, praise, mating opportunities, and prizes.  The 
moral and conceptual foundations of merit and desert judgments are 
complex11 and cannot be plumbed here, but it is vital to understand that 
merit attributes are often (but not necessarily) resource attractors.  They 
are thus distributional criteria of sorts, whether in market, centrally 
directed, or other economic systems.  The close coincidence of the related 
terms “merit attributes” and “resource attractors” thus permits some 
interchangeable use.  Suppose, now, that we can enhance these 
distributional criteria through technological alteration.  Those persons 
already in a position to draw substantial resources may sharply augment 
their resource attractiveness—possibly in a self-accelerating cycle that 
draws increasing wealth and power to the enhanced persons.  In at least a 
metaphoric sense, then, one’s very merit is increasing—one’s “merit 
basis” is “stepped up”—thus amplifying one’s claim for still more of 
everything, including still more merit.  The resulting risks of increased 
and more inflexible social stratification are obvious.12  The risks seem 
lessened when enhancement is temporary and must be repeatedly 
renewed—a point to retain throughout this discussion.  One existing 
parallel is the distribution of educational resources, particularly 
advanced and specialized higher education.  Another is wealth itself.  
One needs it to get more of it and even to keep what one has.  Here, the 





 11. See GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987).  Merit attributes such as a willingness to 
sacrifice one’s interests to promote those of others may or may not attract resources.  Of 
course, little is known about the exact genetic underpinnings of complex moral virtues 
such as altruism, though genetics must play some nontrivial role. 
 12. See Leonard M. Fleck, Just Genetics: A Problem Agenda, in JUSTICE AND THE 
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 133, 143 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lappé eds., 1994) 
(noting that “[t]his [referring to germ line genetic engineering] would create the very 
definite possibility of a genetically permanent ‘master class’”). 
 13. A close comparison and ranking of these values is not possible here. 
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6.  Repair of Disorder14 as Distinguished from Enhancement;        
Disorder Versus Enhancement Models15                                                
for Justifying Trait Alteration 
If a pathological condition is successfully treated, we are unlikely to 
describe the restorative process or its result as enhancement unless the 
intervention appears to go beyond canceling out the disorder and induces 
a non-natural condition that masks or displaces the impairment rather 
than restores the patient’s ex ante personal baseline.  If the improvement 
is justified by a supposed medical need, however, complaints of unequal 
distribution of enhancement resources may be blunted, although existing 
complaints about unequal access to medical resources will obviously 
continue.  In many cases, the two models are partially merged, as in 
measures to increase immunity or other forms of resistance to certain 
disorders or conditions. 
More generally, equality issues concerning enhancement will not just 
vanish when a disorder model is invoked.  For one thing, reliance on a 
disorder model will not go unopposed.  One can question the moral 
relevance of the distinction between disorder- and enhancement-based 
justifications for distribution: If an egalitarian imperative requires 
remedial measures, then—resource scarcity aside—what difference does 
the therapy versus enhancement contrast make if one’s relative position 
will be improved either way?  One can also see the difficulties in 
distinguishing between the two modes of justification in various other 
cases.  For example, repair of a fracture might make one less vulnerable 
to future fractures, leaving one stronger than before the injury.  And, as 
we saw, germ line or somatic manipulations that make one less 
vulnerable to, say, infectious diseases straddle the distinction between 
treatment or repair, and enhancement.  An oft mentioned example of 
these difficulties is the use of human growth hormone.  Its 
administration as treatment for short stature caused by pituitary or other 
disease is more readily accepted than its use on short persons not 
suffering from a height impairing disorder, although from the short 
person’s viewpoint, it may make little difference what accounts for his 
fate.16  Use of the hormone where there is no recognized disorder is 
 
 14. “Disorder” is meant to embrace a family of ideas, including disease, sickness, 
illness, injury, trauma, lesion, and defect. 
 15. “Model” refers, loosely speaking, to an abstract guide for some task, for 
example, evaluation and justification. 
 16. See Dan W. Brock, Enhancements of Human Function: Some Distinctions for 
Policymakers, in ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS, supra note 9, at 48, 66. 
Could enhancements of normal human function also promote fair equality of 
opportunity?  . . . . 
  The problem for grounding claims to treatment, but not enhancement, in 
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often seen as technological enhancement rather than treatment, 
although it is a remedy of sorts for a socially handicapping trait.17  Of 
course, whether something is a treatment at all rests on whether it is 
directed at a disorder, disease, injury or the like, and this may again 
depend in part on a society’s cultural habits and existing environmental 
conditions.  What are considered socially (un)acceptable emotional states, 
for example?  What are the prevailing attitudes toward persons of very 
short or tall stature?  There may of course be no clear, univocal answer.  
Does a society’s current physical plant (for example, lots of stairs, few 
elevators) contribute to the limitations of persons with particular 
conditions?  Still more, the treatment versus enhancement distinction 
might be viewed as immaterial to the more general goal of 
normalization18—a concept overlapping, but distinct from, that of 
enhancement.  But the standard of normalization may rise with 
increasing use of enhancement or treatment and the notion of relative 
handicap, or even disorder, may thus expand, with possible unfortunate 
consequences for the handicapped. 
Despite problems with the systematically murky treatment versus 
enhancement distinction, however, it is far from meaningless.19 
D.  Enhancement, Illicit Transformations, and Compromise                         
of Identity, Merit, and Desert; the Paradox of                                   
Perfectionism; Effort and Merit 
The traits a given culture most values at a particular time, such as 
intelligence,20 strength, and the capacity for diligent effort, are (1) the 
 
equality of opportunity is understanding why the same disadvantage should 
have a claim on social resources for its removal when it is caused by disease, 
but not when it is within the range of normal human function and in the 
absence of disease. 
Id. 
 17. See David B. Allen & Norman C. Fost, Growth Hormone Therapy for Short 
Stature: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, 117 J. PEDIATRICS 16, 19 (1990). 
 18. See generally Anita Silvers, A Fatal Attraction to Normalizing: Treating 
Disabilities as Deviations from “Species-Typical” Functioning, in ENHANCING HUMAN 
TRAITS, supra note 9.  See the additional discussion of species-typical functioning as a 
standard for limiting our duties to rectify inequalities in opportunities, infra note 75. 
 19. Compare the notion of interventions to maintain or restore familiar modes of 
functioning mentioned in Silvers, supra note 18, at 115. 
 20. There seem to be circumstances when intelligence might be considered a 
negative merit attribute.  See High IQ Score Keeps Man Off Police Force, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 9, 1999, at A14 (“A federal judge dismissed a lawsuit by a man who was deemed 
too smart to be a New London, Conn., police officer.”). 
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main targets of traditional improvement efforts such as training and 
practice, and (2) arguably the most sacrosanct against technological 
tampering.21 
So, the very traits selected for improvement are precisely those 
whose artificial (“non-natural,” “identity compromising,” and “externally 
induced”)22 augmentation is the most suspect.  Indeed, if the wrong paths 
are taken, we may not even count the result as improvement or the 
accomplishment as entirely praiseworthy.  The very status of merit 
attributes as merit attributes may be impaired when they are 
technologically refashioned to extend beyond one’s pre-existing natural 
baseline, as augmented by traditional effort.  But traditional baseline 
methods of self-alteration are not only not banned, they are required by 
perfectionist-progress ideals.  Whether such personal obligations inform 
societal obligations to assist individual perfectionist efforts, of course, 
depends on the content of the perfectionist ideal, and in turn on 
underlying basic value conceptions.  The upshot is that bettering 
ourselves in inappropriate ways not only does not perfect us, it arguably 
lessens us; in a sense, more is less.  Similarly, dispensing with effort as a 
critical component of achievements and improvements might “cheapen 
their value and cheat the social practices in which they play a role.”23 
As a rough intuitive matter, enhancement also raises troubling images 
of compromised personal identity and so again confuses our assignments 
of credit or rewards.  If technology threatens identity, it also threatens 
 
 21. See generally Ronald Cole-Turner, Do Means Matter?, in ENHANCING HUMAN 
TRAITS, supra note 9, at 151, 157 (“[I]s the alteration of the self by technical means the 
same as its alteration by traditional means?  I will argue that it is not.”). 
 22. The terms “natural” and “artificial” must of course be used, if at all, with great 
caution.  For example, behaviors such as wearing clothes are obviously unnatural in one 
sense and perfectly natural behavior in another—so much so that it is part of the human 
baseline of conduct which is generally not even considered to be relevant to the issues 
underlying the natural versus unnatural distinction.  In most social circumstances, going 
without clothes would likelier be viewed as unnatural. 
 23. Eric T. Juengst, What Does Enhancement Mean?, in ENHANCING HUMAN 
TRAITS, supra note 9, at 29, 38 (describing, but not necessarily endorsing, the argument); 
see id. at 39 (discussing “[e]nhancements as [c]orrosive [s]hortcuts”); see also Brock, 
supra note 16, at 58 (alluding to the defeat of Kasparov by computer program “Big 
Blue” in a chess match, asking whether the “engineer who implemented the moves” 
could claim that he had defeated Kasparov, and concluding that “the means of acquiring 
the capacities required for the activity are as much valued and admired as the 
performance of the activity.  They are a part of the very definition of the activity, and 
transforming them transforms, and can devalue, the activity itself.”); David M. 
Frankford, The Treatment/Enhancement Distinction as an Armament in the Policy Wars, 
in ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS, supra note 9, at 70, 72 (pointing out that a drug effective 
in treating Alzheimer’s disease would not be an enhancer when used for that purpose, 
but might be so viewed when used to elevate chess-playing ability, at least after 
considering the nature of chess norms and whether “the manner in which the activity 
[chess] would or would not be destroyed” by using the enhancer). 
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the moral and political relevance of merit and desert.  In turn, where 
merit and desert ascriptions are undercut, equality constraints become 
more muddled than usual.  To assign greater rewards to those of greater 
merit than others does not, on some views of equality, breach equality 
standards and indeed may be required by them.  If we cannot say who 
won the race, however, we cannot fully justify our assignment of prizes. 
The very capacity for effort at self-improvement or anything else 
seems to be a merit attribute, so this deserves some additional comments.  
We often prize trying hard, which we commonly view as under our 
control, as much or more than native endowments, many of which seem 
arbitrarily fixed.  The results of traditional forms of striving are thought 
to be consistent with a stable identity.  But the very capacity to try is 
itself thought to be influenced by genetics and often noncontrollable 
aspects of environment, as are other merit attributes.  The talent for 
persistent struggle is thus itself (in theory) subject both to technological 
and nontechnological improvement.  How should we morally rate an 
increased capacity to exert diligent effort when the capacity is itself 
altered technologically?  Isn’t this as questionable as alterations of 
supposedly fixed traits, such as intelligence, and of incrementally 
improvable traits, such as strength?  One thinks of steroid use in athletics 
here. 
Still, it is also possible, in some contexts, to view technological 
enhancement of endowments, including the capacity for effort, as itself 
reflecting a kind of praiseworthy effort.  An increment in powers of 
memory, for example, may be unearned but nevertheless possess both 
intrinsic and instrumental value, as where it aids air traffic controllers in 
keeping up with the ever-increasing flood of flight data. 
E.  Demand for Enhancement Resources; Economics 
The scale of demand for such resources depends on many variables that 
cannot now be clearly identified and measured.  These variables include the 
nature of the enhancement, its monetary costs and perceived medical risks, 
the (dis)incentive effects of gatekeepers and their standards (physicians as 
well as bureaucrats may keep the gates because of medical risks), cultural 
variables (whether technological enhancement is (dis)favored in general or 
for specific traits will obviously affect its level of use), interpersonal 
pressures (also influenced by culture), links and interactions among 
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different traits, and personal preferences.  Different forms of technological 
enhancement may, of course, fare quite differently in the market.24 
Any stable economic unit requires supply and demand equilibrium for 
any commodity and this presupposes diminishing returns for incremental 
distributions.  Diminishing returns will no doubt set in at some point for 
distributions of increments in merit, but as noted, this onset may be quite 
late in the game (as with many medical resources generally).  You may 
not value another hot dog, but you can always stand to be smarter.  
There may even be expanding returns at various distributional stages.  
To make modeling and prediction still more difficult, different 
assemblies of merit traits may interact in unpredictable ways in the 
market; some traits will reinforce or potentiate each other, some will 
impair each other, some increments can substitute for others, and so on.  
Finally, recall the impact of extent of social use: being highly intelligent 
is less valuable when all are highly intelligent, yet there may be as much 
or more pressure to consume enhancement resources even if solely to 
maintain one’s position. 
III.  COMPETING VERSIONS OF (IN)EQUALITY25 
A.  A Thought Experiment Not Far Removed from Reality 
This exercise is meant to illustrate differences in specifying what is to 
be equalized through distribution.  If the egalitarian goal is to attain X = 
Y, what might X and Y be and what does “=” mean? 26 
Suppose we have a mechanism (for example, drugs, somatic gene 
therapy, or germ line alteration) that can significantly enhance mental 
abilities.  There are many possible distributional schemes for the 
enhancing techniques.  The distributees might be individuals or possible 
individuals in early embryonic or even dissociated gametic form.  The 
distributive mechanism might be markets, central direction by 
government, or kinship and other interpersonal relations.  The individual 
effects of the technology, favorable or not, are likely to vary among 
persons.  Sophisticated models will take account of the variability, but 
simplifying assumptions concerning uniform efficacy are appropriate for 
now.  For example, one might assume that we will see the same per-dose 
linear increments in a given ability for all persons, or the same 
proportionate increases, or more generally that effectiveness is a direct 
 
 24. See generally Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999). 
 25. See generally RAE ET AL., supra note 4; LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY (1993). 
 26. Here, of course, the equal sign does not refer to mathematical equality or to 
other ascriptions of identity. 
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or inverse function of pre-existing ability—the abler one is, the greater 
or lesser the increment.  It is also helpful to leave aside the fact that 
mental abilities come in many varieties as well as strengths and that their 
recognition and status may vary among cultures.  The particular regulatory 
or licensing schemes that would implement the distributive plan are not 
discussed here.  Whatever the schemes are—for oneself, one’s children, 
or some group—the licensing procedure must embrace either a 
substantive criterion or some objective mechanism such as a lottery or 
queuing (neither of which is entirely objective). 
1.  Market Distribution 
Free market exchange implements a sort of equality of opportunity 
based on ability to pay (including payments via insurance or through 
one’s borrowing power).  There is an extensive literature on the moral 
foundations of markets, including commentaries on the role of 
characterizing existing distributions of goods and bads as just or unjust, 
and on the impact of preinstitutional desert and fairness in promoting 
realization of legitimate expectations, but this is left aside here.27  
Enhancement might be financed through health insurance mechanisms, 
particularly where the procedure can be viewed as treatment for 
disorder, defect, or injury, or at least within that ballpark (recall the 
example of immunological augmentation).28  Here, a ratio is equalized 
across persons: the amount of the dose is proportionate to one’s financial 
resources or economic power.29  As for nonmarket distribution via 
central direction, we might consider the following options. 
 
 27. See generally Nien-Hê Hsieh, Moral Desert, Fairness and Legitimate 
Expectations in the Market, 8 J. POL. PHIL. 91 (2000).  Hsieh argues that the fairness and 
legitimate expectations path provides a better moral account of why someone has some 
moral claim to what he receives “in virtue of his decision to” enter some line of work 
than does the idea of “preinstitutional desert.” Id. at 104.  The latter, he argues, fails 
because of a lack of proportionality between what people receive in the market and what 
they are thought to deserve.  See also discussion infra Part III.A.1.b. 
 28. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE GENOME: 
THE CHALLENGE TO EQUALITY 62–85 (1998) (discussing the role of insurance in 
providing access to genetic technology). 
 29. This is more or less the case with higher education. 
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a.  Centrally Directed Distribution of Equal                                     
Doses to Everyone 
This is a simple, ham-fisted sort of equality.  It suppresses individual 
variations and thus bypasses questions of need, merit, and utility.  The 
ratio of dose to threshold status as a person is the same for everyone. 
b.  Distribution in Proportion to Need 
What is equalized here is the ratio of dose to need.  Need is a 
disputed concept for several reasons, including the facts that it may be  
based on one’s relative status within a population, that it exists in 
degrees, that it is afflicted with the difficulties within the treatment 
versus enhancement distinction, that it may be linked to nothing more 
than one’s preferences or goals, and that it may be unclear what 
follows from an ascription of need. Are there duties not to interfere 
with anyone’s trying to meet their needs, or government duties to 
provide assistance?  If need rests on having a recognized disorder or 
injury, then only the afflicted receive doses, for example, the demented 
or persons with Down syndrome.  It is unclear how to apply a need 
standard to statistical outliers who are not disordered but nevertheless 
are handicapped by their distance from the median.  And need may, as 
suggested, be task related.  Did Einstein need enhancement to make 
progress on a unified field theory? 
The fact that one’s needs may be based on being relatively worse off, 
whether in natural endowments or environmental circumstances, 
requires special attention.30  Well-known political and moral theories 
call for redistributive measures or forms of “redress”31 because many of 
the worse off are seriously disadvantaged.  Rawls’s difference principle, 
for example, suggests distribution of resource attractors to equalize the 
dose-to-need ratio where need is linked to relatively low status.32  The 
 
 30. “Needs” is itself a tendentious term.  One needs food, but does one need the 
same elegant and appetizing fare that wealthier persons enjoy?  Some have suggested 
that the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1994 & 
Supp. II 1996), might be invoked to protect the employment and health insurance 
prospects of at least the worst off of the worse off.  The burdensome merit gap between 
them and others might be characterized as a disability, although the argument is a stretch.  
Think also of claimed rights of access to stimulant drugs for students with attention 
deficit disorder and related conditions.  These drugs are among the nearest analogies we 
have to smart pills—although this characterization also is a stretch. 
 31. “Redress” is also a tendentious term here.  For one thing, some may view the 
idea as restricted to correcting wrongs, but uneven distribution of resources is not 
necessarily wrong.  For another, measures of redress may not be individuated or 
proportional to individual victimhood. 
 32. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75–80, 100–02 (1971) (discussing and 
applying the difference principle; stating that: 
FINALSHAPIRO.DOC 2/11/2020  2:32 PM 
[VOL. 39:  769, 2002]  Human Equality and Democracy 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 787 
difference principle, however, can also be viewed as threatening other 
visions of equality, as well as values of autonomy, justice, and fairness.  
Redistribution entails interference with autonomy and is arguably 
unfair in allowing some persons (the worse off) to reap the full benefits 
of their native abilities, and beyond, while preventing others (the better 
off) from doing so.  Of course, a central question is: “redistribution of 
what?”  The existing stock of wealth?  Opportunities for enhancement? 
c.  Distribution in Proportion to Social Utility33 
The ratio equalized here is dose to social utility.  The social utility 
of a distribution pattern might be inversely or directly related to the 
distributee’s relative ability, without regard to whether disorder 
underlies his or her low-end status.  Distribution to those 
handicapped by low intelligence might reduce the need for social 
services.  As for the very talented, think of encryption specialists 
trying to break an enemy’s code.  (Suppose that the British Enigma 
program hadn’t cracked the German code in World War II.)  Only 
those on or near the edges of human ability would become licensees.  
One might even expect pressures on government to require certain 
workforce groups, if not everyone, to use enhancement resources— 
though enforcement might be quite unpleasant,34 not to mention 
 
 No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable 
starting place in society.  But it does not follow that one should eliminate these 
distinctions.  There is another way to deal with them.  The basic structure can 
be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least 
fortunate.  Thus we are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up the 
social system so that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the 
distribution of natural assets or his initial position in society without giving or 
receiving compensating advantages in return. 
 Id. at 102.  But cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150–53 (1974) 
(presenting an entitlement theory, which sharply contrasts with Rawls’ difference 
principle); see also id. at 228–31 (criticizing Rawls’ notion of collective assets). 
 33. These distribution patterns may be closely related to those based on the dose-
to-merit ratio. 
 34. Enforced use would probably be held to interfere with a fundamental 
constitutional liberty interest, although its precise designation is unclear.  It might be 
characterized as a right to mentational or physiological integrity, privacy, personal 
security, and in certain cases a somewhat more specific right to refuse medical treatment.  
The U.S. Supreme Court also might be pressed to come up with other formulations of 
liberty interests, narrower or broader, possibly of varying strength, and bearing different 
standards of review.  Recall that Planned Parenthood v. Casey worked a relative 
downgrading of the liberty interest in choosing to have an abortion, apparently 
displacing strict scrutiny language with that of “undue burden.”  Planned Parenthood v. 
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immoral and unconstitutional, perhaps as a violation of (inter alia) the 
Thirteenth Amendment.35 
d.  Distribution in Proportion to Pre-Existing Merit 
There are native (endowed) merit attributes such as mental abilities, 
physical agility, and the capacity for diligent effort.  There is also 
acquired merit based on accomplishment, good works, and developed 
skills and aptitudes.  (The division between these two forms of merit is 
hazy.)36  Here the ratio equalized is dose to merit.  On this standard, the 
answer to “Who merits (more) merit?” is simply: those who already are 
highly meritorious.  This sharply contrasts with a view of equality that 
sees natural variation in aptitudes as something to be overcome rather 
than accepted as a suitable basis for distributing life’s rewards.37 
e.  Distribution in Proportion to Intensity of                                   
Personal Preference 
The criterion here is how badly one wants something, including 
enhancement itself as a major facilitator for success generally.  
Extremely (pathologically?) intense preferences might be viewed as 
needs.  Preferences and their intensities may also be regarded as a form 
of merit.  We admire persons whose desire to win is strong enough to 
overcome serious odds. 
f.  Distribution to Achieve Equality of Outcome 
Here, doses are distributed so that all have equal intelligence, however 
this level is chosen.  There is no unitary concept of intelligence and the 
task of equalizing all recognized forms of intelligence38 seems farfetched, 
if not incoherent, but we are pursuing a loose thought experiment, after 
all.  This rather open-ended outcome standard may entail that everyone 
be as intelligent as the previously most intelligent or that the more 
 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875–76 (1992).  For a brief discussion of constitutional limitations 
on interference with use of or access to enhancement resources, see discussion infra 
Part V.  This includes remarks on germ line intervention as a protected aspect of 
procreational autonomy; equal protection issues resting on disparity of treatment in 
regulating rights to acquire and use enhancement resources; and, more generally, 
constitutional constraints on differential treatment of enhanced and unenhanced persons. 
 35. There would also be issues of government tort liability and of public and 
private violations of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 36. Cf. SHER, supra note 11, at 5–8, 53–68, 109–31 (discussing various kinds of 
desert claims and the relationship between merit and desert). 
 37. See discussion supra note 32. 
 38. See generally ROBERT J. STERNBERG, BEYOND IQ: A TRIARCHIC THEORY OF 
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (1985). 
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intelligent are affirmatively impaired (they receive negative doses) to 
reduce their status39 while the less intelligent are upgraded.  If the 
desired uniform ability level is , the ratio equalized is the absolute 
value of dose effectiveness to distance from , including positive and 
negative doses. 
The driving force here might be the alarming idea that equality 
requires or is promoted by making persons as identical as possible.  On 
the other hand, equality of outcome may refer to identical changes, 
leaving everyone’s position in the pecking order the same.  Of course, 
these varying forms of equal outcome are in general quite different, and 
they bear only an uncertain relationship to more general forms of 
equality of outcome in income or wealth, social standing, political 
power, and so on. 
g.  Distribution by Lottery 
In an effort to avoid the immense difficulties in applying the ideas of 
equality, fairness, and justice, some have recommended distribution of 
scarce resources via lottery.40  Perhaps in this sense lotteries represent a 
form of being “unprincipled on principle.”41  In any case, the 
suppression of interpersonal differences entailed by lotteries (once the 
lottery’s constituency is defined—itself a difficult step) is both the point 
of resorting to them and the chief objection to them. 
Randomization schemes cannot be properly denounced on egalitarian 
grounds without a theory of equality that explains why equalizing over 
some fields rather than others (for example, doses, the ratio of dose to 
merit, or other ratios) reflects or produces true equality, or at least a 
preferable form of equality.  If a satisfactory equality theory is unavailable, 
values other than equality must be invoked.  As it stands, lotteries serve 
some visions of equality and rationality and contravene others.  On one 
 
 39. See Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY 
HOUSE 7 (1950) (story involving this handicapping theme). 
 40. BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY (1992); Michael Waldholz, Unit of 
Roche Sets up Lottery for AIDS Drug: Enough for 2,280 Patients Will be Given Out Free 
Under Pact with FDA, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1995, at A5.  See generally George J. 
Annas, Allocation of Artificial Hearts in the Year 2002: Minerva v. National Health 
Agency, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 59 (1977) (constructing a hypothetical case before the U.S. 
Supreme Court that addresses constitutional issues concerning distribution of artificial 
hearts). 
 41. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The 
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 76 (1961). 
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view, lotteries promote equality because all who qualify for the lottery 
(as mentioned, qualifying itself may raise serious equality issues) have 
an equal chance of winning it, despite their varying personal 
characteristics.  Indeed, it is precisely the attention to these varying 
individual traits that constitutes for lottery supporters a violation of 
equality.  Such interpersonal variations, rather than basic personhood 
itself, are to be suppressed, on their view.  On the other hand, some will 
receive the resource and others will not, without a substantive reason.  
This situation is arguably irrational and thus a violation of equality 
standards, possibly because of prevailing views of personhood and its 
entailments. 
B.  Equality Wars: Conflicting and Concurring Versions of Equality  
and Inequality; Remedies for Inequality; Equality,                      
Enhancement, and Respect for Persons 
1.  In General: Equality of Whom or What and with                               
Respect to What? 
What do we assert in saying that X = Y?  X and Y might, for example, 
designate persons; groups; opportunities or prospects held by persons or 
groups; means for taking advantage of opportunities to achieve one’s 
goals; specific outcomes, such as wealth or victories; social or moral 
status; political power; rights as persons,42 without regard to differing 
traits; traits characterizing different persons; ideas, conceptual systems, 
and philosophies; and overall (net) personal or group merit or social 
worth despite differing traits. 
Each possibility rests on concepts that are themselves difficult to 
penetrate and are likely to reflect serious political and philosophical 
differences.  To assert equality of noninterference rights, such as free 
speech or free exercise of religion, is far from asserting equality of 
means, opportunity, or prospect in securing audiences or places of 
worship.43  And these differing equalities may hold drastically different 
positions of respect and commitment among different persons and 
groups within a society and from society to society.  Fundamental 
noninterference rights are protected under the United States 
Constitution.  Affirmative (welfare) rights generally are not, even when 
directed toward increasing or preserving equality (in whatever sense). 
The rejection seems to be founded partly on autonomy grounds and 
 
 42. STEPHEN DARWALL, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 189 (1998) (describing the view 
that “[a]ll persons have value themselves quite apart from the merit of anything they 
achieve or accomplish. . . .  People matter in themselves.”). 
 43. See generally RAE ET AL., supra note 4 (discussing these concepts). 
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partly on rival views of equality and fairness or justice.  Redistribution 
entails that some receive unearned rewards and others do not and 
different persons will be allowed to keep different proportions of their 
wealth or income.  The flags of equality, fairness, and justice are carried 
by all sides here—a point that should be retained throughout this 
discussion. 
One could raise parallel questions by asking about the meaning of the 
equality operator “=.”  Is it an assertion of fact (Arnold’s strength is 
equal to Sylvester’s) and if so, of what sort?  Is it a moral or political 
claim about equal rights or entitlements, and if so, to what?  Does it 
reflect an ideal both of the threshold equality of persons, whatever their 
differences, and of how they should be treated?  If we say all persons are 
equal because they are all equally persons, why is undifferentiated 
personhood the right level of abstraction rather than personhood 
qualified by particular (dis)favored traits?  If we say that the political 
power of person or group X equals that of person or group Y, we may 
mean they have equal numbers of votes, or equal power to elect 
candidates of their choice, or equal power to influence government 
policies (a particularly obscure claim), or any of several other options.  It 
is not clear that we can justify our choice among meanings here via 
reference to equality alone, without reference to justice, fairness, 
autonomy, and utility—even if equality is not fully reducible to any of 
these other values or to some subset of them. 
2.  Equality and the Special Status of Merit Attributes 
Judgments about an individual’s merit are often relied on as a 
fundamental ground for sorting people—specifying certain (in)equalities 
or differences among them—and for acting on these characterizations.  
The governing moral intuition (perhaps not in all cultures) is that outside 
the domain where only threshold personhood counts, persons are to be 
judged on their relative merits and not on arbitrary personal 
characteristics or relationships.44  It is difficult, however, to formulate a 
coherent theory for sound application of the epithet “arbitrary.”  For 
example, is it arbitrary, and thus perhaps morally improper, for 
individuals to search for a mate solely within their principal social 
 
 44. Characteristics irrelevant for most purposes may in fact serve as criteria for 
certain highly particularized tasks, such as casting of actors by reference to sex, 
ethnicity, race, or age, as stipulated in the dramatic work to be performed. 
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group(s), which may be defined in part on the basis of ethnicity, race, 
religion, or national origin? 
But comparative merit judgments are also criticized because, among 
other things, they produce unequal outcomes and may rest on unjust 
features of the status quo.  Moreover, as we saw, distribution of 
resources that strengthen one’s measure of merit may expand and reify 
existing inequalities, even if it remains unclear whether artificial 
enhancements would be recognized as true merit claims. 
3.  The Valuation of Equality 
As Temkin asks: “Is equality really desirable?  And what kind of 
equality should we seek—that is, insofar as we are egalitarians, should we 
want equality of opportunity, primary goods, need satisfaction, 
welfare, or what? . . .  When is one situation worse than another regarding 
inequality?”45 
The question of what equality means is distinct from the question of 
whether it is desirable or valuable, although the two inquiries are linked 
in complex ways—assignment or recognition of meaning often involves 
value analysis.  There is, to be sure, an oddity in asking about the value 
of equality or of any basic value.  How can one value basic values when 
these basic values represent the very terms in which value is defined and 
assessed?  However paradoxical this may seem, we characteristically 
rank order our values and assess them with respect to each other.  But 
this is a matter for a comprehensive enterprise in moral theory. 
4.  Rectifying Inequalities 
Plainly, a major issue in genetic enhancement is whether it should be 
used to rectify inequalities by affirmatively creating equalities—and if 
so, how.  (“Rectify” is used in the sense of repair, not compensation for 
injustice.)  Suppose that we reach a rough consensus on the preferred 
idea of equality in various situations.  There nevertheless may remain 
significant differences over appropriate measures to rectify or prevent 
inequalities.  For example, if A’s cache of goods is v but B has more, 
holding w, is A intrinsically worse off when B acquires still more but A 
continues to hold only v?46  From an equality standpoint, is it better to 
 
 45. TEMKIN, supra note 25, at 3. 
 46. Note Temkin’s distinction between a person-affecting version of equality, which 
“would condemn inequality only insofar as it adversely affects people,” and an impersonal 
one, which “would condemn inequality even if there was no one for whom it was worse.”  
Id. at 11 (emphasis deleted).  See also id. at 246 (contrasting extended humanitarianism 
with equality, stating that the former is not about equality: “Extended humanitarianism is 
concerned with how people fare, but not with how they fare relative to each other.”). 
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achieve equality by raising A’s holdings from some outside source or 
transferring some of B’s holdings to A?  Or to enhance A’s aptitudes and 
let him, on his own, try to overtake B?  Should we worry more about 
inequality between certain groups than inequality within those groups?47  
Rectifying existing or past inequalities may implicate procedures, such 
as transfer payments, that themselves may violate specific conceptions of 
equality.  Such redistributions arguably impair the right to reap the 
benefits of one’s natural gifts, as amplified by skills acquired through 
effort.  As mentioned, they entail that some persons—those less well 
off—can acquire additional resources earned by others, and perhaps can 
keep a larger proportion of what they earn in the market than can others. 
5.  Rectifying Differences 
A rather drastic (and perhaps technologically impossible) maneuver 
would be to make as many persons as identical in major respects as 
possible.  Perhaps the most extreme case would be a population consisting 
of a single human clone (in the collective sense).  That group might have 
equality problems, but those problems would surely be rather different 
from, but not necessarily less intense than, ours.  The costs in reduction 
of cultural and physical diversity and the loss of multiple perspectives in 
human endeavors seem very difficult to bear, although the radical 
transfiguration of human life makes these losses hard to assess from our 
present frameworks.  And, of course, the resource costs in trying to 
equalize everyone would be prohibitive.  In any case, difference does not 
entail inequality in any sense relevant here and few are on the stump for 
technological erasure of human variation.48  Whatever rectification of 
differences may take place, significant interpersonal variation will 
endure, and may even become greater, as suggested. 
6.  Equality and the Morality of Inclusion and Exclusion 
One might select among competing ideas of equality by appealing to a 
preferred morality of inclusion—of lumping (rather than splitting) 
 
 47. Id. at 285. 
 48. See generally Erik Parens, The Goodness of Fragility: On the Prospect of 
Genetic Technologies Aimed at the Enhancement of Human Capacities, 5 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICS J. 141, 146–47 (1995) (discussing enhancement directed toward eliminating 
chance imperfections and its possible consequences, such as diminishing the need to 
respond to others’ vulnerabilities). 
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individuals and groups by appealing to their similarities.  One might also 
do the opposite.  Either option would represent a choice to emphasize 
one of two related perspectives over the other.  One viewpoint sees the 
technology of perfection as allowing displacement of chance variations 
by implementing planned similarities.  We will all be perfectly equal 
because we will all be equally perfect.  On the other hand, the very 
emphasis on the equality of those made perfect may impose serious 
burdens on those viewed as so disabled or handicapped49 that they 
cannot be made perfect.  Such burdens may also be placed on the 
possibly large group of persons left behind because of lack of access to 
enhancement resources or unwillingness to use them. 
7.  Is Equality Empty? 
Perhaps the indeterminacies (a term left undefined here) or conflicts 
within the idea of equality cannot be eased by further analysis of 
equality, standing alone.  There seems to be no overarching notion of 
equality to appeal to in all contested cases.  The tensions may be 
irresolvable,50 though occasional consensus on certain matters may be 
attainable. 
This is the central idea behind the claim that equality, at least in many 
important circumstances, is empty—a vacuous concept.51  The emptiness 
claim is roughly that the egalitarian maxim, “treat persons (dis)similarly 
situated in (dis)similar ways,” cannot be understood and followed 
without a substantive moral or political theory of (dis)similarity that 
cannot itself depend on equality.  We need, on this view, a theory with 
normative content to tell us what difference a difference ought to make.  
Equality alone does not tell us what characteristics or actions (or 
 
 49. This is discussed extensively in From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. 
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1; see also HANS S. REINDERS, THE FUTURE OF THE 
DISABLED IN LIBERAL SOCIETY ix–x (2000) (referring to the question of “how genetic 
testing affects our views of people whose lives may be indirectly implicated [by 
reproductive genetic choice], i.e., whether genetic testing implies a negative evaluation 
of the lives of disabled people”). 
 50. Cf. TEMKIN, supra note 25, at 286. 
[T]he statistical measures represented a fine start toward elucidating inequality, 
but . . . unfortunately economists did not adequately pursue the source of their 
plausibility.  Had they done so they might have . . .recognized that inequality is 
even more complex than had been realized, that some [statistical] measures 
conflict at a very deep level—as the ultimate views underlying them seem 
fundamentally opposed—and that the statistical measures are best regarded as 
merely first approximations for capturing certain aspects of inequality. 
Id. 
 51. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
537 (1982).  But see Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1167 (1983). 
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anything) to lump as relevantly similar, nor what to split or suppress as 
relevantly different.  For example, if government action permits some 
speech and restricts other speech on the basis of content, we cannot tell 
whether a constitutional or moral equality principle has been breached 
without a substantive free speech theory. 
C.  Equality and Other Values: Conflicts and Connections 
It is often said that in many circumstances, equality, autonomy, fairness, 
justice, and utility (or any subgrouping) conflict.52  The nature of the 
conflict of course depends on the versions of equality and other values 
under review.53  A standard example is affirmative action.  Distributing 
benefits on the basis of racial, ethnic, or gender criteria entails reduction 
of opportunities—which can be viewed as a reduction of liberty and 
autonomy—for those without the relevant characteristics.  It also imposes 
forms of personal association on unwilling persons.  These processes and 
outcomes conflict not only with particular views of equality, but with 
ideas of fairness, justice, autonomy, and utility.54  Yet these values are 
invoked as reasons for affirmative action.  On any given set of views, 
justice may dictate what egalitarian maneuvers to prefer, for example, 
that equality of opportunity, in justice, requires some degree of access to 
enhancement resources either via noninterference rights or via positive 
entitlements.  Or some states of affairs or actions may be viewed as 
unjust because of a violation of some equality standard.   
 
 52. Although one might urge that these values, rightly understood, do not 
genuinely conflict, this position can be ignored for present purposes and we can focus on 
whatever tensions we perceive. 
 53. The distinctions cannot be fully sorted out here.  See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, 
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); RAWLS, supra note 32; Sir Isaiah Berlin, Two 
Concepts of Liberty, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 141 (Anthony Quinton ed., 1967); 
GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988). 
 54. There are category level problems in listing basic values; they are not 
necessarily all on the same moral plane of abstraction.  Justice as fairness, for example, 
suggests that at least certain versions of fairness are criteria for a more abstract concept 
of justice.  Or it may suggest that justice is a subset of fairness.  Note also that, although 
liberty and autonomy are not synonymous, they are sometimes used interchangeably 
here. 
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D.  Distributional Equality Generally; Distribution that              
Transforms the Distributees; Distributional and              
Nondistributional Equalities 
1.  Distribution and Personal Transformation 
Distributional equality concerns who gets what, why, when, and how, 
and under which given system for distributing scarce resources.  It 
addresses matters both ex ante (for example, who gets the 
merit-enhancing commodity) and ex post (for example, who gets what 
rewards—including still more merit—after the distribution and, at least 
in part, as a result of it).  This distinction between ex ante and ex post is 
particularly important given the possible transformative effects (left 
undefined here) of the distribution of enhancement resources.  
Augmentation may change the structure of the distributional game by 
disproportionately enlarging the distributee’s resource drawing power—
ratcheting it up so that it is hard to undo.  One might argue that all 
distributions transform the recipients and that there is no sharp 
distinction between the transformative effects of education or training, 
on the one hand, and of technologically augmented intellectual or 
physical functions, on the other.  This is obviously true, but the absence 
of clear borders marking a distinction does not of itself trash the 
distinction. 
2.  Equality and Reduction, Mere Use of Persons,                                   
and Objectification: Some (Largely)                                  
Nondistributional Problems 
Suppose that we believe a practice of enhancement reflects and 
generates excessive concern with the quantification of specific traits and 
thus reduces persons to the utility of these traits.  This reduction is 
intimately connected with the processes of “mere use” and 
“objectification” of persons—their devaluation or descent from persons 
to objects.  A person who is (at least partially) objectified, reduced, and 
subject to mere use has thus suffered an egalitarian loss, and probably 
other losses, such as impaired autonomy.  (If everyone were reduced or 
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IV.  ENHANCEMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON (IN)EQUALITY; 
(NON)DISTRIBUTION OF ENHANCEMENT                                                    
RESOURCES; REGULATORY CHOICES 
A.  Nondistribution Options: Nonallocation at the Macro                   
Level; Restrictions on Manufacture, Distribution,                                  
and Use; Black Markets; Paternalism and                                
Community Self-Protection 
1.  In General 
There are many commodities that we think, for whatever reasons, 
should not be distributed widely, if at all.  To limit distribution, we can 
avoid allocating resources to the creation of such evils.  If this fails, we 
can enact prohibitions or lesser regulations concerning distribution and 
ultimate use, although this may risk greater loss of control because of the 
rise of black markets.  For example, prohibitions or severe restraints on 
use of enhancement resources may compound their risks by inhibiting 
safety controls such as physician guidance. 
Whatever we decide about use of the commodity, the selection of the 
best regulatory mechanisms to implement our preferences remains 
open.55  Resolving this may require empirical inquiries to inform the 
moral, legal, and policy options.  Certain arguments frequently offered 
to justify nondistribution require attention because they bear on equality. 
2.  Nondistribution to Protect Those Who Prefer Nonuse:                     
The Perceived Risk of Greater Inequality as a                              
Coercive Factor; Technology-Driven Demand for                            
Greater Skills and Thus for Enhancement 
People often do things they would rather avoid because, if they do not, 
they fear others will gain advantages over them.  One might say that 
doing so reflects a constrained preference—it is what they want only 
under adverse, dispreferred circumstances.  This is not necessarily bad.  
For example, a child averse to learning to read may find a second-best 
reason to do so when advised that “all the other kids are doing it.”  
Similarly the risk of falling behind in athletic activities may drive some 
competitors to steroids or other supposed enhancers that they would 
 
 55. See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic 
Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 (1999). 
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otherwise avoid.  Although one can dispute the claim that this is rightly 
called coercion via excessively strong incentives, a strong sense of 
pressure in some form on the unwilling is likely.  In some contexts, this 
matter is easily put aside.  Many athletes and students do not wish to 
practice, study, train hard, or diet, but (ordinarily) few speak seriously of 
coercion in these contexts.  One must compare such standard efforts 
with, say, ingesting memory or muscle enhancers to reduce the time and 
effort the tasks would otherwise require.  Some pressure to make the 
standard efforts is widely considered desirable—possibly obligatory 
under some circumstances—but not so with the technological option.  
The general endorsement of standard forms of self-improvement counts 
against using pejoratives such as “coercion” or even “undue influence.”  
But the wide use of these characterizations when technological 
enhancement is an option suggests that something is believed to be 
amiss. 
More generally, pressures favoring enhancement of living persons, 
fetuses, and possible persons are likely to increase.  There is some 
evidence of technology-driven increases in the demand for human 
capital as reflected in investment in education and training.56 
3.  Paternalistic Nondistribution to Protect Persons Against        
Physical or Psychological Harm; Autonomy                                       
Versus Autonomy 
Enhancement measures, whatever their efficacy, carry risks of 
adverse effects.  Of course, the nature, incidence, and seriousness of 
such effects, perhaps even whether they are in a given context 
adversities at all, is largely unknown.  One justification for 
nondistribution may thus be pure paternalism (another term left 
undefined here).57  Another justification, suggested above, reveals 
autonomy’s internal tensions.  One might promote autonomy by 
reducing coercive incentives58 to use disfavored commodities, but this 
may reduce one’s range of choice.  Think, for example, of the legal 
limits on selling human tissue and organs.  A broad interpretation of 
“coercive” may thus impair the autonomy of those who want to use the 
suspect resources and who knowingly assume their risks. 
 
 56. See generally Jacob Mincer, Human Capital: A Review, in LABOR ECONOMICS 
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 109, 133 (Clark Kerr & Paul 
D. Staudohar eds., 1994). 
 57. See generally PATERNALISM (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983). 
 58. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987), for a rigorous study of the idea of 
coercion and related concepts. 
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4.  An Equality Argument Against the Preceding                                 
Nondistribution Arguments 
Those seeking access to enhancement resources may of course also 
offer an important equality argument. Without the resources, they are 
denied equality of opportunity to better themselves and are relegated to 
an inferior status as against their superiors, whose natural gifts are as 
arbitrarily deemed meritorious as are the enhanced traits. 
5.  Nondistribution to Reinforce Equality Values and to Avoid 
Devaluation of Life and of Effort; Ambiguities of Identity 
a.  The Lombardi Effect: Winning Isn’t Everything—It’s                       
the Only Thing;59 Paradoxes of Reduction  and                         
Valuation; Reduction as Compromising Equality 
We learn in part from observing and interpreting social practices, 
including sports.  The societal risk here lies in the lesson or message that 
athletic victory is worth serious physical or mental harm.60  If the 
practice is banned, getting caught and sanctioned is also perceived as a 
risk.  However, it is the ban itself that is in question here.  Note also that 
to characterize the risk as mere, as in risking life and limb for mere 
athletic victory or for show, presupposes certain value premises.  One 
might urge, for example, that in a nation besieged by enemies on all 
sides, the supposedly adverse lesson about winning at all costs is useful 
for national self-defense by reinforcing a warrior state ideal. 
To the extent the victory-is-all lesson is learned by observers and the 
competitors themselves, it may, to some, reflect and constitute a reduction 
of human value to a single function or goal, whether of athletic or other 
competitive success.  Such reductive devaluation bears on equality.  Those 
persons who are reduced (a concept strongly linked to mere use and 
objectification) are seen as less worthy than others and thus unequal to 
 
 59. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 925 (Emily Beck ed., 1980) 
(attributing the remark to football coach Vince Lombardi). 
 60. A 1984 poll of uncertain rigor reported that Olympic athletes would accept 
death at an early age in a Faustian exchange for guaranteed gold.  Fifty-five percent of 
the athletes polled at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics said that they “would take a drug 
that could kill [them] five years later if it enabled them to win a gold medal.”  Shapiro, 
Technology of Perfection, supra note *, at 82 n.229 (citing Bjorn Edlund, Ambition, 
Profit and National Pride Drive Athletes to Drugs, THE REUTERS LIBRARY REPORT, Sept. 
27, 1988, at 1). 
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full-valued persons.  The enhanced, if that appellation survives, may be 
viewed as (partial) artifacts of lesser merit who leapfrogged over their 
associates and competitors.  If so, it may be the enhanced who require 
protection from the unenhanced.61  In that event, resulting inequalities of 
distribution would not be perceived as reflecting true differences in 
personal worth, and artificially enhanced talents would not be seen as 
lessening or devaluing the natural talents or acquired skills of others.  
The value of enhanced persons will have collapsed into a narrow range 
of traits based on their prospects of victory.  This supposed reductive 
risk carries us to the next difficulty. 
b.  Troublesome Links Among Enhancement, Value Reduction,                
and Positive Valuations; Role of Risk Taking;                                    
Person Perception 
Value reduction by focussing on specific traits or accomplishments is 
intricately linked to valuing persons positively—viewing them as 
meritorious and deserving of our high regard.62  We value persons not 
only because of the traits that define their threshold value as persons, but 
because the strength of those traits distinguishes those persons from 
others.  How does this differ from reducing them to their traits?  If we 
cannot explain the difference, the contrast between reduction and 
positive valuation seems empty.  Suppose that an athlete says “winning 
is the only thing and is worth my life.”  Does this reflect her reduction 
and lesser status in her own eyes or the eyes of others?  Or, on the 
contrary, supervaluation and greater status?  Or some combination?  The 
more general question concerns how we indeed perceive each other as 
particular persons.  This is an issue not only for moral and political 
theory and practice, but for continuing work in cognitive psychology. 
The answers to these issues in person perception may depend partly on 
cultural baselines.  The United States, for example, is not about to ban 
football or boxing because the athletes risk severe permanent injuries or 
death.  But incremental risks beyond a traditional baseline may be 
rejected because they reflect inappropriate trade-offs.  All risks are 
 
 61. Cf.  John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic 
Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1274, 1305–25 (1986) (discussing “the egalitarian interests of a genetically 
superior minority versus the egalitarian interests of a genetically inferior majority: who 
would harm whom?” (capitalization omitted)).  There may be a chicken and egg 
ambiguity here: those selected for devaluation might already be disvalued through some 
other mechanism.  Whatever else is done to them compounds the initial recognition or 
assignment of low value. 
 62. Such judgments may reflect moral evaluations or a sense of personal bonding, 
or both. 
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justified, however, if winning is everything or the only thing.  For 
example, think of escalating boxing to fights to death.  Such a view 
arguably reflects a debasement of the value of life in the eyes of the 
audience and in the competitors’ own eyes.  This particular argument 
would of course not directly apply to “magic bullets”—zero risk, but 
effective enhancers. But even here there may nevertheless be possible 
adverse effects of extreme focus on the traits needed to win. 
As for risky actions undertaken for intellectual enhancement, such as 
using a dangerous, possibly fatal drug that greatly augments memory, 
the situation is unclear and may depend on cultural circumstances 
affecting the comparative valuation of traits (for example, intellectual as 
against athletic abilities).  In Frank Herbert’s novel Dune,63 rival feudal 
houses far in the future relied on resident Mentats—wizards of a sort—
who amplified their pre-existing exceptional intelligence with an 
addicting substance (the spice).  They evidently were judged both on 
their initial baseline abilities and on the level of their enhanced abilities, 
the latter probably being a partial function of the former.  Perhaps they 
were also judged on the skill with which they enhanced themselves and 
on their courage in facing the risks in using the drug.  In this sense, at 
least a sliver of their endowed merit endured.  Given their culturally 
imposed duties, what they did can be characterized in context as 
praiseworthy effort rather than merely as gaining an unearned benefit.  
Moreover, their work would continue to reflect effort and struggle if, 
partly as a result of their enhancement, the complexity of their tasks 
increased.64  Those who can do more challenging work are likely to have 
it presented to them.  Still, as suggested, artificial enhancement may not 
be viewed as meritorious enhancement at all.  Indeed, from this 
standpoint, the more revered an attribute is, the more it is corrupted 
through technology’s manipulations, and the more degraded is the 
enhanced person. 
 
 63. FRANK HERBERT, DUNE (1965). 
 64. See Cole-Turner, supra note 21, at 156, stating that: 
Even if technology increased our cognitive ability itself, not just by giving us 
faster computers but faster brains, so that we could calculate or write or think 
more clearly, these activities would still be a struggle in the face of even 
greater intellectual challenges to which we human beings would inevitably set 
ourselves. 
Id. 
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c.  Avoiding the Social Devaluation of Effort 
This category embraces both paternalistic and nonpaternalistic reasons 
for nondistribution of elite-creating resources.  As suggested, one 
possible (if often inaccurate) impression conveyed by a visible practice 
of enhancement is that the enhanced are getting a free ride, or at least a 
reduced-cost ride.  So, it is argued, enhancement entails getting too 
much bang for the buck—cheating of sorts—even if done in the open.  
To the extent this is what is perceived, effort may be devalued as a norm.  
If so, merit judgments will be distorted, as will our estimates concerning 
the (in)equalities holding among competitors.  But the claim that merit 
or other evaluations are “distorted” presupposes some preferred baseline 
from which to measure distortion.  What are we to make of the fact, for 
example, that some students, relying on their own natural gifts, even as 
aided by traditional forms of rigorous study and training, will be 
disadvantaged in college entrance examinations as against artificially or 
unnaturally able persons?  To avoid this inegalitarian disadvantage and 
the disruption of prevailing norms, would a student need a license 
reflecting that she had not been enhanced before the exam?  Or might it 
be the other way around—“nonenhanced need not apply”?  Of course, 
one may question the sanctity of prevailing norms, but, within reason, 
communities have some defeasible moral and legal right to maintain the 
major features of their normative systems.65 
Devaluation of effort might also (paradoxically) arise from enhancing 
the very ability to make efforts.  Some authorities, for example, say that 
steroids may expand one’s capacity for physical exertion, presumably 
delaying the point of exhaustion.66  We might thus view the result as 
“external” to one’s character—an outside supplement that carries no 
merit. 
d.  More on Threats to Identity; Confused Attributions;                        
Effects on Equality Judgments 
i.  Altering Living Persons 
Recall the distinction between germ line alteration and gene therapy or 
other somatic treatment on living persons, fetuses, and embryos.  In 
dealing with living persons, some aspects of equality concern assessing 
 
 65. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote 
Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350 (1991). 
 66. Compare a report that notes that “[i]n athletes, androgens are believed by some 
to enhance the motivation to train and thereby to lead to better physical development.”  
Edward J. Keenan, Anabolic and Androgenic Steroids, in DRUGS, ATHLETES, AND 
PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE 91, 96 (John A. Thomas ed., 1988). 
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the fairness of returns on effort and of rewards for one’s native 
endowments, particularly when effort and endowment are combined.67  
Such judgments obviously require identifying and comparing persons.  
Enhancement may, however, confuse notions of personal identity in at 
least two ways.  It may create ambiguity as to the source of one’s 
performance—whether it is internally generated and thus causally 
attributable to that person, or the result of external artificial 
augmentation and thus attributable to an outside source.  If the latter, 
then one might say the person in question “did not do it.”  The 
judgments of merit and desert underlying the distribution of rewards will 
also be confused. 
Moreover, enhancement may, by altering personal traits, appear to 
interrupt the continuity of human identity, which in other circumstances 
endures despite gradual, historically acceptable change.  In both situations 
equality appraisals—at least in extreme cases not yet at hand—may be 
distorted or even meaningless.  Who or what is equal to whom or what?  
Who won the fight?  Should an enhanced Mentat transplanted from a 
Dune world be eligible for a chaired professorship68 or the Nobel Prize?  
Should he be rewarded only if all other candidates had similar enhancement 
opportunities?  Do major trait changes truly compromise personal identity?  
Think, for example, of a sudden escalation of intelligence from average to 
extraordinary.69  After all, as one might argue, one’s baseline identity 
 
 67. For a possible example of (unintended) enhancement combined with effort, see 
Susan King, Reliving His Field Dreams, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at F22 (referring to 
a movie, The Rookie, that described the career of pitcher Jim Morris, who had earlier 
dropped out of minor league baseball because of injury.  Years after surgery, Morris 
started throwing again, and his fastball had gone from preinjury 85 mph to 98 mph. He 
was sent up to the major leagues and he stated: “When they fixed my arm at 25, they 
didn’t fix it for me to pitch . . . .  They fixed it for everyday life . . . .  For some reason, 
my arm speed picked up.”). 
 68. Data, a character in Star Trek: The Next Generation, was ultimately awarded 
the Lucasian Chair—the same Cambridge chair held by Sir Isaac Newton.  See Robert 
Bruen, A Brief History of the Lucasian Professorship of Mathematics at Cambridge 
University, at http://www.math.ohio-state.edu/~nevai/547/lucasian.html (May, 1995). 
 69. Cf. DANIEL KEYES, FLOWERS FOR ALGERNON (1966) (presenting a character 
with impaired intelligence who suddenly becomes brilliant after brain surgery intended 
to enhance his abilities; the story was made into the film Charly); see also POUL 
ANDERSON, BRAIN WAVE (1954) (a science-fiction novel in which the earth suddenly 
passes out of a region of space containing an intelligence-impairing field; the result is 
universal substantial increments in intelligence, resulting in various complications).  
Note the possibility, however, that merit should be restricted to matters of traditional 
effort in strengthening endowed traits—not to the endowed traits themselves and not to 
technological increments in the measures of these traits. 
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doesn’t really disappear—the new one is built on it, although all new 
identities will continue to differ sharply from each other.  One can well 
imagine educational institutions debating whether their admissions 
criteria should exclude augmented persons as not truly meritorious 
unless their natural abilities and their accomplishments ex ante—their 
enduring merit—would have secured their admission.  Should we 
indeed compare and rate persons only on the basis of endowments pre-
enhancement?  Or is this irrelevant history?70  Even if pre-enhancement 
merit remains relevant, the locked-in resource accumulations made 
possible by accelerating returns might be viewed as going far beyond 
fair rewards for ability—assuming that that distributional criterion is 
considered sound. 
ii.  Altering Germ Lines 
Identity problems may take on a different form when one considers 
the genomically enhanced as well as those who were enhanced 
somatically.  Genomic enhancement might be accomplished through 
alteration of early embryos or of gametes.  The somatically enhanced 
can be further divided into persons enhanced in utero, as embryos in 
vitro, or as young children, or as adults.  Our sense of self-identity, 
autonomy, and personal worth may differ sharply depending on our 
knowledge of the nature and timing of our enhancement and of the 
reasons for it.  Knowing that one’s genome was altered will not 
necessarily have the same impact as knowing that one’s physiology was 
altered.  There will also be differences depending on the timing of the 
somatic changes.  If they occur prememory, for example, the person 
would know herself only in the enhanced form, which would appear as 
part of her native endowments.  In any of these variations, think of 
children asking their parents just why their natural identities were 
tampered with or even changed, whether genomically or somatically.  
Was a potential person (the unenhanced entity) adversely affected 
because its existence was blocked and replaced by another person 
deriving from the altered entity?71 
 
 70. Although one can talk of equality among shape-shifting (here, merit-altering) 
entities, it is a not-quite-intuitive notion of equality. 
 71. See Roberta M. Berry, Genetic Enhancement in the Twenty-First Century: 
Three Problems in Legal Imagining, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 715, 729–31 (1999), for a 
description of hypothetical enhancements cases. 
But the advantage conferred in Kevin’s case—an advantage realized by his 
parents’ application of their knowledge to the tailoring of his genome—has 
become a source of deep and confusing distress to him.  Kevin increasingly 
feels not only ‘inauthentic,’ but irremediably so.  He feels both that he is not 
really himself and that there is no ‘real self’ for him to be.  He lost contact with 
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B.  The Equality Impacts of Technological Enhancement:                         
More on Distributional Options 
1.  In General: Enhancement that Alters the Bases for                      
Distributing Benefits and Burdens 
As we saw earlier, the equality impacts of distributing anything 
depend not only on matters of fact but on what notions of equality are 
used.  In turn this may determine who or what is being compared and 
targeted for which forms of equalizing, and with respect to what 
distributable forms of trait changes.  We may be addressing existing or 
future persons, families, groups, or other entities, with respect to 
equalizing income, wealth, social status, legal and political rights, and 
opportunities of many sorts.72 
We now need also to distinguish between distribution of enhancement 
resources and distribution of all other commodities.  Distribution of 
enhancement resources changes the game by altering the criteria for 
resolving distributive claims; this feedback may be far more striking 
than that arising from the distribution of education and wealth. 
2.  Do Disorder-Treatment Models Blunt Equality-Based              
Objections to Enhancement Distributions?:                                  
Treatment as Restoring Equality Rather Than                               
Distorting It Through Enhancement 
The connection between disorder models and equality was suggested 
earlier.  If one’s relative incapacity is disorder based, health care may 
restore normality.  It may also create normality for congenitally 
disordered persons by raising them to a “normality baseline.”  This is 
 
his ‘real self’ when ‘his’ DNA was replaced by manufactured DNA.  The ‘real 
self’ who was lost upon substitution of the DNA was not really Kevin but 
someone else, someone who can never be, but whose DNA now makes up 
most of Kevin. Kevin’s distress leads him to ruminate about his success.  He 
sometimes feels that he has won his success at the expense of that ‘real self’ 
who was lost.  Kevin’s ruminations have led him to second-guess his parents’ 
motivations.  Why were they so interested in designing Kevin for success in 
life?  How could they be so focused upon this goal that they were willing to 
use the ‘real self’ as a platform for devising Kevin?  Kevin has come to resent 
what he sees as their presumption—in imposing their conception of him upon 
the ‘real self’ and in tailoring him for success from the cellular level on up. 
Id. at 730. 
 72. See RAE ET AL., supra note 4, for more illustrations. 
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less likely to be viewed as a suspect form of enhancement, at least 
where the disorder and matched treatment are well recognized as such.  
Indeed, such medical intervention may be thought to promote equality 
by reinstating or creating equality of opportunity, undistorted by 
adverse medical conditions.73  In other respects, however, the practice 
of such intervention may worsen certain equality conditions by 
generating social pressures to move affected persons to normality, 
which in turn may downgrade “alternative lifestyles.”  This can 
adversely effect various groups, such as those within the Deaf 
Culture.74  Nevertheless, there will be strong pressures to expand the 
boundaries of the disorder treatment model in order to secure insurance 
or other forms of payment.  Of course, the greater the expansion of 
coverage of various medical conditions and groups of persons, the 
higher the price of insurance, and the greater the exclusion of lower 
income groups. 
But enhancement not justified within a disorder model is likely to be 
seen as impairing equality in several ways.  One is by distorting 
nature-based equality of opportunity resting on native endowments as 
elevated by customary forms of self-improvement.  Another is by 
interfering with the unequal but arguably justified outcomes of 
competitive pursuits.75  This is of course heavily dependent on the 
 
 73. See Juengst, supra note 23, at 35 (referring to the view of Daniels and Sabin 
that health care is “one of society’s means for preserving equality of opportunity for its 
citizens”); see also BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1. 
 74. Cf. REINDERS, supra note 49, at 54, 177–78 (noting that there are members of 
the deaf community who prefer the Deaf Culture and do not want to become hearing 
persons). 
 75. See Norman Daniels, The Genome Project, Individual Differences, and Just 
Health Care, in JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 12, at 110 
[hereinafter Individual Differences].  The study notes that health care services: 
restore people to the range of capabilities they could be expected to have had 
without disease or disability, given their allotment of talents and skills.  Our 
standard model for thinking about equality of opportunity thus depends on 
taking as a given the fact that talents and skills and other capabilities are not 
distributed equally among people. 
Id. at 124.  Daniels also refers to the idea of “medical need” for a service: 
Generally, this is taken to mean that the service involves treatment of a disease 
or disability, where disease and disability are seen as departures from species-
typical normal functional organization or functioning.  Characterizing medical 
need in this way implies a contrast between uses of medical services that treat 
disease (or disability) conditions and uses that merely enhance human 
performance or appearance.  Enhancement does not meet a medical need even 
where the service may correct for a competitive disadvantage that does not 
result from prior choices.  Accordingly, medicine has the role of making 
people normal competitors, not equal competitors; this role fits . . . with the 
standard model for thinking about equality of opportunity. 
Id. at 122.  Daniels then presents a critique and “limited defense” of the model.  Id. at 
125–27.  He observes that he is: 
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reigning political philosophies. On the other hand, suppose that 
enhancement becomes legal, its use disclosed, its price relatively low, 
and its efficacy roughly the same for all.  Then, whatever other 
objections would remain, inequality concerns would be partially 
muted, though remaining important because of enduring positional 
differences.  Of course, other moral issues about enhancement would 
remain. 
However, if variations in natural endowments were thought 
irrelevant to merit and desert, the point of distinguishing treatment 
from augmentation would largely be lost, except for clear medical 
 
not trying to save the appeal to a natural baseline here because there is 
something magical or metaphysically basic about it. . . .  Rather, the natural 
baseline both facilitates and reflects moral agreement about the urgency of 
medical care.  I also believe there is moral justification for limiting in some 
ways the task involved in protecting equality of opportunity, otherwise it will 
be discredited as too demanding an ideal. 
Id. at 126–27.  His critique is thus consistent with the basic point that species-typical 
functioning, however useful in making the desired distinction between treatment and 
enhancement, is itself normatively ambiguous in certain ways, although many of its 
applications seem objectively sound.  See his analysis in Just Health Care: 
[I]f persons have a fundamental interest in preserving the opportunity to revise 
their conceptions of the good through time, then they will have a pressing 
interest in maintaining normal species functioning . . . by establishing 
institutions, such as health-care systems, which do just that.  So the kinds of 
needs picked out by reference to normal species functioning are objectively 
important because they meet this fundamental interest persons have in 
maintaining a normal range of opportunities. 
NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 28 (1985).  He elaborates on the concept of 
normal species functioning, taking as his basic formulation the relation between disease 
and “deviations from the natural functional organization of a typical member of the 
species.”  Id. at 28–32 (emphasis deleted).  See also his response to the argument that 
resting on the normal opportunity range is society relative and thus circular.  He 
emphasizes that “our reference point is normal species-functional organization and 
functioning, not functioning in a certain society.”  Id. at 55.  Nevertheless, although the 
concept, as he explicates it, seems precise enough to be workable for many purposes, the 
idea of “species-normal” cannot be fully determined, and so intersects to some extent 
with the idea of society-determined normality and with normative evaluations.  This 
limitation is implicitly recognized in his defense of the concept of disease, which is 
charged with being more normative than descriptive.  Id. at 29.  He concludes: “It is 
enough for my purposes that the line between disease and the absence of disease is, for 
the general run of cases, uncontroversial and ascertainable through publicly acceptable 
methods, such as those of the biomedical sciences.”  Id. at 30. 
Of course, for our purposes, a central question remains: However (im)precise the 
concept of disease, why—and how strongly—should it be a limitation on access to 
enhancement resources?  Not everyone will buy into—at least to the same degree—the 
idea that we are morally justified in imposing limits on the demanding “task involved in 
protecting equality of opportunity,”  Individual Differences, supra, at 127. 
FINALSHAPIRO.DOC 2/11/2020  2:32 PM 
 
808 
need.  As Daniels puts it, if one rejects the standard model that takes 
the distribution of abilities as given, then “the distinction between 
treatment and enhancement has no point, at least where enhancement is 
aimed at equalizing capabilities.”76 
3.  Enhancement and the Demise of Merit; Person Perception               
Again; Interpersonal Comparisons of Merit, Desert, and                
Equality; Entrenchment of Elite Blocs (New or Old);                         
Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Dimensions                                                      
of Enhancement 
a.  In General 
Perhaps the very idea of merit would largely drop out if the use of 
enhancement resources were widespread and comprehensive, surviving, 
if at all, only when applied to judging skill in securing and using such 
techniques.77  If we also do not deserve the traits we each received From 
Above, what meaning could merit have other than as a rough estimate of 
economic worth?  Assuming such no-merit assessments are made, they 
are likeliest when living persons are augmented by medical and surgical 
means, including somatic cell gene therapy or “genetic pharmacology.”  
But our more immediate target is to trace possible effects of such 
enhancements on different forms of equality—social equality, political 
equality, equality of opportunity (broken down into matters of means, 
prospect, and so on),78 group equality—and on the roles of merit and 
need in making equality judgments.  Although these broad and rather 
clumsy categorizations of equality can carry us only so far, they are 
useful starting points. 
Social equality rests partly on the differing frameworks for person 
 
 76. Individual Differences, supra note 75, at 124.  The distinction is thus, from that 
viewpoint, as arbitrary as the interpersonal differences of the genetic lottery.  Cf. id. at 
124–25 (suggesting that knowledge derived from the human genome project “might 
make the distinction between disease (including genetic disease) and the normal 
distribution of capabilities seem more arbitrary”). 
 77. Whether this rejection of the possibility of incremental merit is morally and 
conceptually sound is not discussed here.  The same negative judgment may also apply, 
perhaps with lesser force, to those genomically altered either by work on their early 
embryos or by alteration of their gametes prior to ovum fertilization. 
 78. See RAE ET AL., supra note 4, at 64–81 (discussing different meanings of  
equality and equality of opportunity—for example, prospect-regarding and means-
regarding forms of equality of opportunity).  For present purposes, equality of 
opportunity refers at least to the absence of outside interference, for example, regulatory-
prohibitive laws and their embedded criteria (“no Klingons need apply”).  Equality of 
prospect concerns similarity in abilities to accomplish one’s goals.  Equality of means 
deals with whether the parties in fact have the wherewithal to do so.  See id. at 65–71. 
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perception79 that we use to appraise each other, and ourselves.  Perhaps 
the genetically enhanced would perceive themselves—and be perceived 
by others—as superior in any of several senses: possessing greater 
intrinsic merit (even if artificially elevated by humans) and hence desert 
for various rewards; being more useful to society—and so more worthy, 
in both moral and nonmoral senses; and belonging to an elite group 
holding substantial political power.  Perhaps this elite group would be the 
successor to an established powerful group or it might constitute a new 
kind of elite based on genetic or other augmentation. 
Another concern is the formation of blocs defined by the particular 
nature of the enhancement.  People regularly sort themselves into groups 
defined roughly by the strength of particular traits—the more intelligent, 
the more physically fit, the more attractive, the more nerdy, and so on.  
Enhancement of these traits might solidify these groups and strengthen 
their political and economic power.  Their probable continued existence as 
discrete and enduring entities is suggested by how they differ from, say, 
political parties in the United States. 
More generally, if distribution of expensive enhancement resources 
followed either a market or a pre-existing merit path, the prevailing 
socioeconomic distances would be enlarged and less bridgeable.  This 
might reinforce adverse views about various ethnic and racial 
characteristics, given the links between these characteristics and income 
or social class.  Because of the self-reinforcing nature of distributions of 
merit—of the very grounds for distribution generally—the creation of 
entrenched elites may be especially hard to reverse.  (If traits involving 
moral virtues such as regard for others were so distributed, however, it 
might seem odd to speak of unbridgeable distances.) 
b.  Threats to Equal Respect for Everyone’s Common Personhood: 
Enhancement as Intensifying Concern with the Strength of                  
Specific Traits, Leading to Reductionism Generally and                               
to Devaluation Resulting from One’s Reduced Standing 
Some equality judgments may involve a sort of suspended belief 
concerning the extent of interpersonal differences.  One reason 
technological enhancement seems more unsettling than familiar forms of 
self-improvement is that it specifically calls attention to the enhancing 
 
 79. DAVID J. SCHNEIDER ET AL., PERSON PERCEPTION 166–69, 267–69 (2d ed. 
1979). 
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agent’s target traits.  Why such enhancement is more salient than long-term, 
gradual advances is an issue for cognitive psychology, particularly as it 
bears on person perception.  In any event, in a technological enhancement 
regime, our common personhood may be overshadowed by a more intense 
focus on interpersonal differences.  Our moral value as persons may be 
partially displaced by our increased nonmoral value as bearers of certain 
traits in certain measures.80  To plan a person’s traits suggests to some that 
those traits, as augmented, reflect his primary or even his only value—value 
here meaning social utility.  This reduction, as suggested, is affiliated with 
the ideas of mere use of persons,81 objectification,82 and related processes.  
The nature of this affiliation will not be investigated; it is not necessary to 
specify which of these notions are criteria for the others or inferences from 
the others, and they are taken as more or less substitutable here. 
c.  Threats to the Valuation of Persons with Conditions Generally 
Viewed as Disabling, Particularly Those Who Decline                   
Measures—Therapeutic or Enhancing—to                                      
Eliminate (or Improve) the Condition or                                                 
Prevent It in Others 
There are conditions that, in some contexts, are not viewed as 
disabilities, but as enablers.  The best known example is deafness, at 
least within what is now known as the Deaf Culture.  Outside that 
culture, if deaf persons decline suitable measures to enable them to 
hear—assuming effective measures are available—they might be 
severely called to task, particularly if they continue to press for special 
social services.  If parents, deaf or hearing, decline these measures for 
their children, they may be criticized even more severely.  These 
measures—the ultimate in “normalization” (as compared to assimilating 
 
 80. See Cole-Turner, supra note 21, at 160 (asking whether we will have 
“amplified our differences and piled advantage on top of advantage” if we do not restrict 
alteration to removal of differences). 
 81. The reference here is to mere use as a violation of the second formulation of 
Kant’s categorical imperative.  See THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL 
REASON IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY 38–39 (1992) (describing “the second formulation of 
the Categorical Imperative”).  A standard translation is: “Act in such a way that you 
always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the presence of any other, never 
simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.”  Id. 
 82. As suggested in the text, it may be unclear which of these terms are 
synonymous and which are criteria for others rather than bottom line terms.  Note that 
these are not all-or-nothing notions.  For example, on “incomplete commodification,” see 
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1933–36 (1987); 
see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 102–14 (1996).  For 
comments on various objectification issues, see Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Reasons and 
Means for Reproduction: On Excessive Choice and Categorical and Technological 
Imperatives, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1180–99 (1996). 
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or mainstreaming)—may, as Silvers states, “devalu[e] alternative or 
adaptive modes of functioning.”83  Still more, there is controversy 
concerning the moral propriety of terminating pregnancies when the 
developing fetus is believed not to be affected by a form of hereditary 
deafness.  Moves to make this more difficult for deaf couples may also 
be viewed as devaluing the Deaf Culture. 
4.  Forms of Regulation; Markets and Other Procedures, More                   
on Equality’s Internal Conflicts 
a.  Natural Differences 
There are obvious natural and acquired differences among persons, 
although the significance of these variations and even their recognition 
may rest both on competing moral frameworks and on cultural 
variables.84  Not all differences—assuming they are perceived at all—
count as inequalities.  In some cases, cultural variation may be of 
modest significance.  Persons born without limbs, for example, will have 
difficulty in moving independently from place to place and this is 
obviously a crucial ability for most persons in most cultures.  But just how 
well such persons fare depends heavily on differences in familial and 
general social practices affecting those impaired in this and other ways. 
Where differences are recognized as significant, however, one must 
inquire into their moral and socioeconomic status and how they are and 
should be dealt with.  The differences might be taken as given and their 
effects left to the workings of decentralized market, kinship, or other 
private arrangements.  Or, communities might try to improve matters from 
some egalitarian perspective, viewing the fact of major interpersonal 
differences as “natural wrongs” or injustices.85  Any effort to displace 
existing practices, decentralized or otherwise, would of course take us into 
different phases of moral and policy analysis, such as identifying 
distributional goals and their relation to individual or familial decision 
making; establishing (if necessary) criteria for distributing resources, 
including enhancement resources; and specifying procedures to verify that 
 
 83. Silvers, supra note 18, at 112. 
 84. See also Hsieh, supra note 27 (discussing preinstitutional desert and its 
competitors). 
 85. See TEMKIN, supra note 25, at 13–14 (“I think some who reject the notion of 
natural injustices would nonetheless agree that it would be morally objectionable to 
disregard such occurrences if we could alleviate them.”).  
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the criteria have been satisfied by prospective recipients (native 
endowments, accomplishments, prospects, and interpersonal connections).  
Any choice of distributional regime—market, nonmarket, or mixed—
necessarily involves contested moral issues.  The “genetic supermarket”86 
may be efficient87 in some sense, but it does not bypass foundational 
problems. 
Recall that the developing technologies involved here are reflexive in 
the sense that they will alter and enhance their consumers, usually by 
someone’s design, and that access to such resources is likely to roughly 
track prevailing distributions of economic or political power.  These two 
conditions change the pre-existing normative terrain considerably 
because each distribution may change any static models we have been 
using by sharply changing the criteria for each successive set of 
distributions.  We can no longer rest on assumptions that major human 
traits characterizing an individual change only gradually, if at all.88 
 
 86. See NOZICK, supra note 32, at 315 n.*. 
 87. The idea of efficiency is an indispensable tool of moral analysis, contrary to 
the occasional protests of nonutilitarians.  Its interpretations, however, are not entirely 
clear or consistent.  Efficiency is a function of preferences and goals and it sorts different 
paths toward implementing them.  If these preferences and goals are not adequately 
advanced by market distribution of particular commodities—or any other particular 
distributional system—then such distribution is not efficient, even if it maximizes some 
criterion of wealth.  Talking of “utiles” doesn’t alter this: the measure of utiles is, again, 
a function of preferences and goals—just as are the notions of being better off and worse 
off in the classic economic definitions of efficiency.  See generally Allan M. Feldman, 
Kaldor-Hicks Compensation, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE DICT. ECON. & L. 417 (1998); Allan 
M. Feldman, Pareto Optimality, in 3 NEW PALGRAVE DICT. ECON. & L. 5, 6 (1998); 
Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and 
Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 671, 702–03 (1993) 
(discussing efficiency and Pareto optimality, including the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of 
efficiency), available at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0515%28199306%2931%3A 
2%3C671%3ATESEAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D (last visited Aug. 19, 2002).  A community 
might be willing to forego greater aggregate wealth in favor of maximizing a particular 
vision of equality through restrictions on some liberties.  More generally, a community’s 
ideals may range far beyond income and wealth.  They may concern community identity 
and norms—including those that concern not only equality, but fairness, justice, 
autonomy, individual rights and welfare generally, character development, and virtue.  
Incremental gains and losses in reaching these goals are dealt with in ways structurally 
similar to how we deal with pure economic efficiency—we wish to maximize or 
optimize the realization of the full set of goals.  See Michael H. Shapiro, Regulation as 
Language: Communicating Values by Altering the Contingencies of Choice, 55 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 681, 686–87, 765–69 (1994). 
 88. See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 593, 622 (1958).  See also CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 35 (1989) (discussing J.S. Mill’s plural voting system and 
pointing out that it “would reinforce existing inequalities in the distribution of property, 
or, at least, diminish the prospects of desirable egalitarian reform”).  See discussion infra 
note 115. 
FINALSHAPIRO.DOC 2/11/2020  2:32 PM 
[VOL. 39:  769, 2002]  Human Equality and Democracy 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 813 
b.  Janus-Faced Equality 
Technological enhancement provides some opportunities to even out 
nature’s hierarchical roughness.  It also creates the possibility of 
worsening it, as emphasized above.89  If such leveling is indeed a 
community moral obligation, whether based on egalitarian or other 
grounds, a ban on enhancement—when used to promote rather than 
impair equality—might violate a principle (corollary to some forms of 
equality) mandating rectification of specified inequalities.  The best form 
of rectification, it might be argued, would be thorough use of 
technological enhancement mechanisms. 
But such apparently egalitarian rectification efforts would require 
centralized intervention into distribution of enhancement resources.  
Enabling the have-lesses to move closer to the have-mores might thus 
itself violate some aspects of equality—and of autonomy, fairness, 
justice, and utility—through coercive redistribution.  As we saw earlier, 
some would lose more of what they earn than others and some would 
receive unearned benefits while others would not. 
In any case, it is unlikely that any distributive scheme would 
substantially level out human traits.  And few, from current perspectives, 
would think it desirable—morally or otherwise. 
5.  A Review: Inequalities Compounded; The “Matthew Effect”                 
and Terminal Social Stratification: The Problem of                                
“Who Merits Merit?” Again 
The rich get richer, the poor get poorer—and the smart get smarter?  
Why not?  The well-educated already qualify more easily for still more 
education, often to the exclusion of the less educated.  “For unto every 
one that hath shall be given, and he shall abound: but from him that hath 
not, that also which he seemeth to have shall be taken away.”90  Merton 
coined the phrase “Matthew Effect” in referring to allocation of 
resources in scientific research.91 
Distribution of scarce resources is of course a classic problem for 
 
 89. See Attanasio, supra note 61, at 1306, 1309; Shapiro, Who Merits Merit?, 
supra note *. 
 90. Matthew 25:29. 
 91. The more established and well-supported scientists accumulate still more 
support on a disproportionate basis as compared with less well-endowed scientists.  See 
Robert K. Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 159 SCIENCE 56 (1968). 
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economics, ethics, political theory, public policy, and just plain politics.  
But the distribution of enhancement resources, as we saw, raises special 
issues.  Enhancement almost inevitably targets merit attributes, which 
are generally wealth-attracting resources. 
The relevance of the Matthew Effect is obvious.  The distribution of 
resources for enhancing merit claims for distribution, as we saw, 
involves a sort of feedback loop. It alters the very ground on which the 
initial distribution is made, generating a multiplier effect.  Under such 
conditions, Thomas Jefferson’s “natural aristocracy” of “virtue and 
talents” is replaced by an artificial aristocracy of technologically 
enhanced abilities.92 
Of course, if the idea of merit does not survive the new age of 
technological alteration, “Who merits more merit” becomes doubly a 
nonsense question.  Not only are we unable to increase our merit 
artificially, but merit itself is gone as a relevant moral category.  Even if 
all or some characteristics lose all or some of their status as merit 
attributes, it seems likely that enhanced intellectual and physical powers, 
unevenly distributed, will continue to attract wealth and resources.  
Business, after all, is business.  Intelligence counts in pursuing scientific 
research, heft counts in football, and attractive faces and bodies draw 
attention and money, whether or not we talk about merit in any of these 
contexts.  The demise of merit, moreover, may not dispatch the view that 
we are nevertheless entitled to the fruits of our varying natural or 
enhanced abilities—whether or not we deserve any of them.  In any case, 
the outcome of decentralized distribution of resource attractors, as 
suggested, might ratchet up social, economic, and political stratification, 
and the hierarchical structures of community life generally.  At least this 
is a potential outcome if distribution is based largely on decentralized 
mechanisms, such as markets, kinship, old boy, or old girl networks. 
6.  Enhancement and Interpersonal Desert: Time Scales,                            
Life Plans, and Social Stability 
a.  Enhancement of Living Persons Within Their                              
Respective Memories 
We are accustomed to the gradual acquisition of merit earned by 
effort, resulting in gently escalating desert.  Sudden, major alterations in 
attributes, particularly merit attributes that help define one’s identity, are 
not generally associated with ordinary persons.  Western culture links 
 
 92. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in II THE 
ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 387, 388 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959). 
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such transformations (“shapeshifting,” for example) to mythological 
parahuman creatures.  But part of the very point of technological 
enhancement is to shorten the time span and reduce the effort needed 
to strengthen one’s attributes up to and beyond their endowed 
maximums and to gain the enlarged rewards.  Such sudden changes in 
individual capacities may present major difficulties to a transformed 
person, to those around her, and to society generally.93  Our choices 
about life-style and life plan have always depended strongly on 
presuppositions about our attributes—both assets and deficiencies—
and their general stability (but a stability consistent with their gradual 
elevation or deterioration).  Suppose, however, that someone of modest 
talents and accomplishments rapidly becomes abler in various respects.  
Would she think that she deserves more of life’s rewards because her 
abilities have sharply increased?  How would she acquire these 
rewards?  Can the newly intelligent or memorious94 just saunter onto 
the grounds of Acme University and demand entry, displacing their 
(new) inferiors?   
Perhaps the awareness of their new powers, combined with the fears 
of others stuck where they are, will provoke political and social 
instability.  A somewhat distant analogy would be the sudden 
emancipation of large numbers of slaves or indentured servants who had 
been denied education and other resources needed to flourish as free 
persons.  Think also of the comparatively rapid (if incomplete) change in 
the status of women in the United States and elsewhere.  Virtually every 
aspect of equality could be challenged by a growing practice of 
technological enhancement.  In particular, the nature of the contests 
between different forms of equality may also change.  The persistent war 
between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome may be 
intensified by the limited availability of enhancement resources that 
greatly enlarge one’s prospects and by the growing distances between 
the enhanced and the unenhanced.  Still, despite the greater inequalities, 
the worst off might become better off in the sense of being wealthier 
because of enhancement-driven increases in productivity.  To invoke an 
unpleasant parallel to the disturbing “happy slave” problem in 
philosophy, one might also imagine the worst off altered, whether via 
germ lines or somatic alteration, to be better off through being happy 
 
 93. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 69. 
 94. Yes, there is such a word.  See JORGE LUIS BORGES, Funes, The Memorious, in 
FICCIONES 107 (1962). 
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with their lot.  But this is hardly a form of emotional enhancement, as we 
might presently understand the term. 
There is thus a two-stage egalitarian problem.  We first have to 
determine who gets merit-enhancing resources.  We then have to decide 
what collective or individual responses to make when faced with the 
escalating demands of the newly enhanced—and the escalating dread of 
the unmodified.  These nouveau intelligent do not suddenly enter the 
fabled set of fully qualified rocket scientists.  But they will argue that 
they have joined the set of persons immediately entitled to further 
education and training, and, within a short time, to appropriate forms of 
employment and their attendant rewards.  It is too early to say whether it 
will make any difference if they frame their claims on merit and desert 
or on economic and social utility. 
b.  Other Enhancements 
Questions parallel to those just raised arise with persons whose 
genomes were altered, or possibly whose traits were revised during 
embryonic development (but without genome changes), or fetal 
development, or in early childhood.  Our responses, however, may be 
different.  All of these persons are likely, in different ways, to look upon 
themselves as identified with important traits they have had wired in for 
as long as they can remember.  Thus, they cannot themselves be fairly 
accused of having tried to evade or soften the struggle for 
self-improvement and to reap unearned benefits.  Those enhanced as 
adults or older children, however, will be able to perceive the differences 
in their attributes before and after enhancement, and those who 
intentionally opted for enhancement might be blamed for such (partial) 
evasions. 
Again, it is unclear how scarce resources such as superior educational 
opportunities and desirable forms of employment could quickly be 
expanded, even over one or two generations, to accommodate a sharp 
escalation of merit claims for access.  A further complication is that 
some forms of labor may become even more disfavored than they are 
now—cleaning and sanitation, simple but hard labor, some forms of 
blue-collar work, and various low skilled personal service functions.  
Other things remaining fixed, however, the shortage of supply for such 
labor would raise its wage rate, which presumably would draw 
applicants willing to trade embarrassment for an enlarged income.  But 
then, their services might be too expensive for many consumers, 
especially among the unenhanced. 
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c.  Both Groups in the Long Run 
The questions just raised also apply to long run considerations, and 
here matters become still more speculative.  How would we forecast 
shifts in attitudes and beliefs about interpersonal comparative 
valuations?  We do not know how we will either positively value or 
reduce each other in value when merit traits are significantly malleable.95 
Still, we are not entirely at sea and can make at least some modest 
tentative projections based on common knowledge of the impact of 
financial and other incentives on decision making.  One would think that 
enhanced persons would often produce superior goods and services, 
which in turn would be used for increasingly demanding tasks.  If so, 
investment would gradually yield institutional responses in both the 
private and public sectors—educational facilities of higher quality, 
increasingly complex mental and physical competitions, and new 
technologies enabling disfavored lines of work to be done more by 
machines and less by persons.  This would generate greater incentives 
and pressures for still further personal enhancement, new stages of 
institutional response, and so on.  It is hard to say where diminishing 
returns and equilibrium would set in.  Recall also that one effect of the 
greater salience and strength of merit attributes might be to amplify the 
social, economic, and political importance of the enhanced traits 
(whether or not we speak of merit).  Still more, individual enhancement 
efforts would often require major investments, both financial and 
emotional (particularly in the earlier periods of technological 
development)—and people would want ample returns on their 
investments.  The result might be still greater emphasis on interpersonal 
differences in the strength of resource attractive and other merit 
attributes. 
One theoretical possibility should be noted for analytical purposes, 
however unlikely it may be. With broad access to similarly effective 
 
 95. The respective residents of our world and a world of widely practiced and 
endorsed technological enhancement are likely to have difficulty even pursuing useful 
conversations with each other on the issues traced here.  This reflects, in part, the 
problem of incommensurability and its uncertain connections with both theoretical and 
applied ethics.  The idea here is, roughly, that one cannot easily use one value framework 
to judge the other because they rely on different standards of moral appraisal; they may 
even address quite different matters (although whether X and Y are “different” may be 
contested).  Whether the idea of incommensurability is sound, however, is a matter for 
another forum.  See generally Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1169 (1998). 
FINALSHAPIRO.DOC 2/11/2020  2:32 PM 
 
818 
agents, there might be little relative interpersonal change, even though 
everyone’s individual performance level was raised.  But such a broad 
upward shift would also represent a major source of pressure for social 
and economic revision: Many persons will be abler, more insistent on 
appropriate rewards for ability, and more concerned about the responsive 
formation of new institutions to satisfy their new levels of talent.  The 
sluggishness of social and political responses to the claims of those with 
newly enhanced attributes may contribute heavily to various forms of 
social instability.  And some instabilities might well arise because of 
negative shifts of attitude toward those with clearly defined disabilities 
or handicaps and even toward those who are simply unenhanced (or not 
successfully enhanced).  Both groups could find themselves plunging 
still lower in relative social, economic, and political standing. 
7.  Equality of Groups and Blocs: More on Social Stability 
One uncontroversial point is that groups and communities play major 
roles in social and political life and, partly as a result of this, in the 
formation of one’s sense of identity and self-regard.  Matters of 
interpersonal equality are thus conceptually linked both to intergroup 
and intragroup equality, and both realms of equality are affected by 
prevalent views on merit and desert. 
Humanity has generally sorted itself into groups and some existing 
groupings are defined by observed or supposed differences in merit traits 
and accomplishments.  Indeed, in a distributional system based entirely 
on the purest notions of merit, with the arbitrariness of prejudice, 
stereotyping, corruption, fraud, and coercion largely absent, one could 
infer that resulting differences in attainments, rewards, and status are 
based entirely on differences in abilities or other merit or wealth- 
attracting resources.  Perhaps this just replaces one set of arbitrary criteria 
(old boy or old girl networks, ability to pay, kinship preferences) with 
another (genetic and environmental lotteries), but this is another issue.  In 
any case, this somewhat intimidating prospect has been addressed in 
several well-known and controversial works.96  If realized, we would in 
theory lose our excuses for failure (for example, “Politics did you in, not 
lack of ability or other qualifications.”).  Our relative status would rest on 
 
 96. Some of the works have generated considerable controversy.  See, e.g., 
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, I.Q. IN THE MERITOCRACY (1973); RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & 
CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN 
AMERICAN LIFE xxi–xxiii (1994); GERALD LEACH, THE BIOCRATS 221–23 (rev. Pelican 
ed. 1972); A Cooler Look at the IQ Controversy, 267 SCIENCE 779, 779 (1995) 
(discussing the view that “the United States is becoming increasingly stratified by IQ”); 
cf. MICHAEL YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 106 (Transaction Publishers 1994) 
(1958) (describing a fictional society where status is based on merit alone). 
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the merits and unambiguously reflect our attributes, perhaps (in theory) as 
in Mensa, whose membership is supposed to be chosen on the basis of 
pure ability rather than of social standing or even accomplishments.  On 
this view, we once again face sharper and less penetrable borders between 
existing groups and possibly the creation of new entrenched factions. 
Still, we do not know whether any given pattern of enhancement 
would inspire social and political instability, or perhaps promote some 
form of stability instead.  Much may depend on whether the lot of the 
worst off is nevertheless improved, despite the greater gaps between 
individuals and between various groups.97  If the size of the gap between 
the better and worse off is great enough, the overall risks of instability 
may go up even if the resources of the less well off increase 
significantly.  Our notions of poverty seem to involve ordinal rankings 
as well as the cardinal value of one’s holdings. 
8.  Political Equality Imperiled: In General 
a.  Shifts in Political and Moral Ideals; Widespread                               
Use and Low-Cost Access 
Many prospective parents, faced with the possibility of genetically 
enhancing their children, may nevertheless prefer the genetic lottery and 
be willing to accept whatever they receive from it.  We often eschew 
planning even where it is possible to plan, preferring vagueness and 
uncertainty to precision and predictability.  Perhaps a partial explanation 
for this is fear of responsibility when things go awry or simply not as 
planned.  Confusion over what to select may also be a factor.  Beyond 
this, such preferences for noncontrol seem linked to what is perceived as 
a defining element of ideal personhood. We envision persons as creative 
and autonomous, not bound by fixed life plans imposed on them either 
by nature or by others.  (To be sure, there may be substantial cultural 
variations in such frameworks.)  Nonpersons have none of these 
attributes.  Neither natural nor assembled objects possess them and other 
living things seem too far off the mark to justify being characterized as 
significantly creative and autonomous.98  But competitive pressures may 
 
 97. See generally Richard A. Posner, Equality, Wealth, and Political Stability, 13 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 344 (1997) (discussing the impact of variations in equality and wealth 
on political stability). 
 98. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 120–88 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing personhood and autonomy). 
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inspire many parents-to-be to seek greater precision of outcome in their 
reproductive plans and (possibly) to rigorously enforce these plans on 
their offspring.  Fear of an unenhanced child’s eventual reaction to 
discovering that she is disadvantaged might well play a role here.  The 
parents in most cases could not properly respond by telling the child that 
she had no alternative existence.  The selfsame embryo from which she 
developed could have been isolated and altered or her traits could have 
been changed after birth. 
Assume that the longer term results of these pressures and of economies 
of scale are nearly universal low cost successful efforts to enhance.  
Equality complications attributable to enhancement would then be greatly 
attenuated, though not entirely removed (and standard equality problems 
would likely endure).  From this particular egalitarian perspective, if not 
others, the more technology and the wider its use, the better. 
However, where there are large scale distributional inequalities, there 
is a risk of (irreversible?) erosion of equality’s status.  Equality could be 
adhered to, if at all, only in the sense of preserving the abstract idea of 
equality of opportunity—no affirmative blockade interfering with one’s 
right to use her pre-existing intelligence and wealth to secure more 
intelligence and wealth, for herself and for her existing or future 
offspring, and to reap the benefits of her enriched capacities, and so on 
down the dynastic generations. 
How might this shift our ideals?  Institutions and practices, by their 
very existence and visibility, communicate ideas and impressions and 
this process may have learning effects.99  Of course, what is learned 
depends on what is perceived or understood and might be reshaped by 
responsive public debate. 
b.  The Segmented Society 
One feature of a world with both genetically and nongenetically 
enhanced persons might be a more rigorous division of labor, perhaps of 
the sort envisioned by Plato in The Republic.100  After all, if we take the 
trouble to (re)assemble our offspring with certain engineered traits, they 
had better do what we planned, right?  Equality analysis here is of course 
beset with factual and normative-conceptual uncertainty.  On the one 
hand, the escalation of technological complexity combined with 
enhancement might lead to greater division of labor and social 
stratification.  On the other hand, enhanced persons might form a world 
 
 99. See Michael H. Shapiro, Regulation as Language: Communicating Values by 
Altering the Contingencies of Choice, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 681, 772–74 (1994). 
 100. II PLATO, THE REPUBLIC §§ 369–75, at 60–68 (B. Jowett trans., Vintage Books, 
Vintage Classics ed., 1991). 
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with less rigorous division of labor because they become polymaths and 
jacks-of-more-than-one-profession. 
Still, it is conceivable that regardless of how rigorous the division of 
labor is, political and social equality of a sort may prevail.  Different 
professions, trades, and occupations, and the varying aptitudes 
underlying them, might be viewed as equally worthy—an equality across 
the enhanced groups.  The alphas may be viewed as equal to the betas, 
though their augmentations (via the germ line or the living body) and life 
work may be entirely different. 
But this is nothing to count on.  It is also plausible to expect that 
equality is largely read out where (from our present perspective) it is 
most applicable and most needed.  The more entrenched the social 
stratification becomes, the greater will be the need for corrective notions 
of equality and of “remediation,” but the less likely it is that there will be 
influential partisans for equality in any sense. 
c.  The More Equalized Society Instead? 
As suggested, enhancement resources might be distributed in ways 
that promote equality in several forms, consistently with whatever 
divisions of labor are implemented.  (Patterns of division of labor and of 
enhancement are likely to affect each other, however.)  Distribution 
might rest on need, where need is linked to enhancing equality of 
opportunity.  Perhaps this would be done through existing mechanisms 
of social assistance, although one might well wonder what impact the 
distribution of enhancement resources would have on various forms of 
public welfare generally.  Moreover, every person might be considered 
to have a stronger claim to augmentation than his immediate superiors in 
pre-existing attributes, giving him the right of first refusal for the next 
set of resources.  And, as we saw earlier, where different traits are 
enhanced, the net equality of the differently enhanced may hold: overall 
merit is equal despite widely varying enhancements. 
Finally, greater equality might be pursued by familiar redistributive 
or other social measures that are not directed toward trait alteration.  
So, there is a slight possibility of a more equalized society.  But this 
possibility should now be vetted through the lens of democratic theory. 
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9.  More on Political Equality Imperiled: Democracy and Governance 
a.  Enhancement and Democratic Theory: Millian Plural Voting                    
and the Attenuation of Democracy 
 i.  Kinds of Democracy; Is “One Person, One Vote” a  
Defining Characteristic of Democracy? 
Two of the obvious foundational questions here are: What are and 
what should be the effects of sharp differences in human characteristics 
on matters of political governance?  If we are not in fact equal to each 
other in deliberative ability, judgment, and drive, why do we all have 
equal voting power in the sense that when casting ballots in general 
elections, no one’s vote counts for more than another’s?101  We are not 
equal in our knowledge of the issues, our abilities to assess competing 
arguments, the nature and intensities of our preferences, our capacities to 
contribute to our social and economic system, our stakes in the outcomes 
of particular government policies, or even in our interest in participating 
in public affairs.  And enhancement technologies may amplify these 
differences to an even greater degree. 
Yet for most of us, democracy seems to be all but definitionally 
connected with the maxim “one person, one vote.”  Unless this maxim 
 
 101. For basic articulations of this idea as a matter of U.S. constitutional law, see, 
for example, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–210 (1962) (holding that a complaint 
alleging that a legislative apportionment debasing their votes denied plaintiffs equal 
protection of the laws stated a justiciable claim); Sanders v. Gray, 372 U.S. 368, 379–81 
(1963) (holding that a statewide primary election system that accorded more weight to 
rural than urban votes and more weight to some small rural counties than to larger ones 
was enjoinable under the Equal Protection Clause).  Justice Douglas stated: “The 
conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can 
mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”  Id. at 381.  See also Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that a legislative apportionment violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it was not based on population and was irrational); Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (ruling that a state poll tax violated 
the fundamental right to vote in state elections and deriving that right from the Equal 
Protection Clause).  For an extended review, see generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., 
WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
OF 2000 (2001).  The “right to vote” is understood here in a largely egalitarian sense; 
Harper does not directly speak to whether a given issue or choice must, on democratic 
principles, or on constitutional grounds (for example, via the Republican Form of 
Government Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4), be submitted to the electorate or even to 
the governing legislature. 
The power actually to elect a preferred candidate may of course be affected by the 
arrangement of electoral units or areas, by whether elections are at large or segmented, 
and so on.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622–23 (1982) (striking down an 
at-large electoral district system for electing members of Congress because its retention 
reflected racial discrimination; under the at-large system, African-Americans were 
unable to elect persons that, as a group, they favored). 
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holds, there is on this view no true democracy.  Is this definitional link 
indeed appropriate given our vast interpersonal differences?  Not all 
political thinkers have thought so.  As Thompson summarizes John 
Stuart Mill’s discussion of plural voting, “The principle of competence 
expresses Mill’s belief that a democracy should give as much weight as 
possible to superior intelligence and virtue in the political process.”102 
Mill thus did not think that equal votes among electors was essential 
to democracy or for promoting the public good—quite the contrary.  He 
endorsed plural voting, though perhaps with later reservations and 
possibly as a temporary measure,103 in which individual citizens had 
votes proportional to their “individual mental superiority.”104  The number 
of votes per elector would thus be a function of his or her revealed 
competence.  Mill discussed occupational success, test results, and 
educational status as criteria for assigning more than one vote.105 
For Mill, plural voting is one method, among others, for furthering the 
principle of competence.106  His idea of competence is complex, however.  
It concerns skills as well as intelligence;107 even highly intelligent 
persons might lack the proficiency or even the aptitudes needed for 
sound governance.  His vision of ideal competence also includes moral 
competence.  Education seems to be not just a proxy for competence, but 
partly constitutive of it.  One supposes that it might also be a proxy for 
native ability.  Finally, Mill qualified his recommendations by 
recognizing that democratic participation values were in tension with 
competence values.108 
What would be the proper use of Mill’s competence principle in a 
 
 102. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JOHN STUART MILL AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
54 (1976). 
 103. Id. at 100; see also MARIA H. MORALES, PERFECT EQUALITY: JOHN STUART 
MILL ON WELL-CONSTITUTED COMMUNITIES 86 (1996). 
 104. JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, in ESSAYS 
ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 371, 475 (J.M. Robson ed., 1977). 
 105. Id. at 475–76. 
 106. See THOMPSON, supra note 102, at 99. 
 107. Id. at 88–89 (stating that certain specialized elites cannot implement the 
functions of Mill’s “competent minority”). 
 108. Id. at 10–11.  For other discussions of Millian plural voting, see, for example, 
Richard J. Arneson, Democracy and Liberty in Mill’s Theory of Government, 20 J.HIST. 
PHIL. 43, 59–62 (1982) (arguing that Mill’s account of plural voting is inconsistent with 
his antipaternalistic stance, given the failure of his other arguments in favor of such 
voting); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 
334–36 (1997); Jeremy Waldron, Legislation, Authority, and Voting, 84 GEO. L.J. 2185, 
2211–12 (1996). 
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world of genetic (or other) enhancement?  Genetic engineering, for 
example, has long stimulated fears that enhancement would threaten 
democracy—at least in forms demanding equal votes for all electors.  
Sinsheimer has asked, “[c]ould . . . deeper knowledge of the realities of 
human genetics affect our commitment to democracy?”109  If mere 
knowledge of the genetic bases of the differing endowments underlying 
Millian competence can threaten democracy, one might well expect that 
the vivid reality of huge gulfs between the enhanced and the unenhanced 
would represent an even greater threat. 
But the nature of the threat to democracy must be specified.  This is no 
simple task, given the fact that democracy may take quite different forms 
and that the status of the one person, one vote standard as the premier 
form of democracy is a question at issue.  All forms of democracy are 
linked by the idea that the governed, or some significant portion of them, 
are to have a major say in what affects them and that this voice is to be 
broadcast by some form of majoritarian aggregating of votes on 
important matters.  This voice is, as a foundational matter, an obvious 
component of autonomy, which is in turn an essential ground of 
democracy, and it is not simply advisory or merely a request for redress 
From Above.  It is to be decisive within important domains, although it 
may be subject to principled constraints derived from constitutions or 
other sources of law.  It is of course hugely uncertain what constitutes a 
significant portion of the governed, or a major say in what affects them, 
or an important domain, but clarifying these concepts is unnecessary 
here. 
Return now to the question that opened this section: Why is the 
political equality that is implemented by one person, one vote accepted 
in the face of individual differences?  Dahl raises parallel questions: “[I]f 
income, wealth, and economic position are also political resources, and 
if they are distributed unequally, then how can citizens be political 
equals?  And if citizens cannot be political equals, how is democracy to 
exist?”110  This is pursued furhter in the next few sections. 
ii.  Applications to an Age of Enhancement 
aa.  One Person, One Vote 
A system of equal votes at the ballot box is far from ensuring equality 
in political influence or in anything else.  Think, for example, of the 
 
 109. Robert L. Sinsheimer, The Presumptions of Science, DAEDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. 
ARTS & SCI. 23, 34 (1978). 
 110. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 326 (1989) (describing 
conflicting theoretical perspectives, not necessarily endorsing any). 
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suppression of group preferences in at-large voting districts.111  
Nevertheless, in its own way, the one person, one vote standard 
implements equality both practically and symbolically.  If effective 
enhancement is feasible, might equal-vote democracy (somewhat 
paradoxically) be the preferred form of political governance because 
of—rather than despite—greater interpersonal differences?  After all, 
even though we are not equally able, we may be more or less equally 
affected112 by particular government policies.  Whatever the unequal 
impacts, they are not uniquely correlated to ability.  Of course, the idea 
of being equally affected bears contested interpretations.  For example, 
to respond that, at least in some spheres, impacts on the less able count 
for less than impacts on the more able presupposes a different theory of 
the equality of persons as persons from what is now held in many 
quarters.  Still, the idea that all persons are equally affected by a given 
kind and degree of adversity might itself be under siege in an 
enhancement age. 
It seems unlikely that unequal allocation of votes would be seen as a 
realistic, efficient, and benign recognition of differences in ability, native 
or augmented, or of the varying impacts of political policies.  It will 
probably be taken, correctly, as reflecting deep disrespect for those 
allotted fewer votes.113  And, no doubt, many of those with more votes—
and some with fewer—will believe that such disrespect is justified given 
the substantial gulfs in resource-attractive or merit traits among persons 
and groups. 
There are, of course, conceptual issues and exceptions implicated in 
the one person, one vote standard.  That standard is arguably attenuated 
in many institutions, such as the United States Senate, where states have 
equal votes whatever their respective populations, or in special voting 
units such as water districts, where votes are allocated on the basis of 
varying rates of use or on other variables.114 
 
 111. See supra note 101, for a discussion of Rogers v. Lodge. 
 112. On the other hand, if the strength of traits differs significantly from person to 
person, one might urge that being equally affected is unlikely.   
 113. See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. 
L.J. 313, 319 (1997) (discussing disrespect).  Mill believed that rational persons of lesser 
competence would agree to a system of plural voting, and he evidently did not take 
plural voting to reflect disrespect in any deep sense.  
 114. Compare Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 
719, 728–29 (1973) (upholding against an equal protection challenge a water district’s 
restriction of the franchise to landowners and apportioning votes in proportion to 
assessed valuation of their respective lands; the Court focused on the “special limited 
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But in general elections, at the ballot box level, plural voting is 
excluded from most modern ideas of democracy.  Mill himself did not 
necessarily endorse it over other techniques for enhancing the influence 
of competent elites.115  He seemed well aware of the substance of the 
Matthew Effect—those with excess voting power may draw increasingly 
disproportionate shares of rewards116 and possibly still more voting 
power, in an extended cycle.  He did not endorse the “blind submission 
of dunces to men of knowledge.”117  He also strongly emphasized 
participation values in democracy, which help to control government and 
to educate the participants, making them more competent.118  Thompson, 
describing Mill’s resolution of the tension, notes that “[j]ust as the 
 
purpose” and “disproportionate effect of [the district’s] activities on landowners as a 
group,” noting that the district did not exercise “‘normal governmental’ authority”), with 
Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 106–07 (1989) (invalidating restriction of voting rights 
on a board empowered to propose local government reorganization to property owners 
was invalid, even though the board’s powers were not “general governmental powers”).  
Both cases seemed to apply the rational basis test—expressly so in Quinn.  But cf. 
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–28, 633 (1969) (using a 
close scrutiny rather than a rationality standard to invalidate a New York statute that 
limited the right to vote in various public school districts to certain property owners or 
lessees (or their spouses) and parents and guardians of students).  For a discussion of 
departures from one person, one vote in residential communities, see Robert C. 
Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1539–63 
(1982) (recommending greater community choice in setting up vote allocation rules). 
 115. See MILL, supra note 104, at 476 (those with plural votes or the class they 
belong to cannot outvote the remainder of the community); THOMPSON, supra note 102, 
at 100. 
 116. BEITZ, supra note 88, at 35. 
[Mill] presumed that those of greater intelligence or education would be more 
effectively motivated to temper self-interest with consideration of the interests 
of others in deciding how to vote.  But this is naive; it seems at least as likely 
that those granted procedural advantages will use them to secure more 
effective representation of their interests than they would receive under a 
scheme of equal votes.  Thus, assuming that those with extra votes would 
disproportionately represent the higher income classes, the scheme would 
reinforce existing inequalities in the distribution of property, or, at least 
diminish the prospects of desirable egalitarian reform. 
Id.; see also Nicholas Lemann, Rewarding the Best, Forgetting the Rest, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 26, 1998, at 4–15. 
The questions we ask about the meritocracy [as defined, in part, by standardized 
tests and the award of degrees]—mostly variants on ‘Who gets the goods?’—
are far too narrow.  Does the elite serve the public, as well as itself?  Do most 
Americans get, through the education system or otherwise, the skills they need 
to lead a good, decent life?  Meritocracy should be a system of governance, not 
a contest over spoils. 
Id.; see generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999). 
 117. THOMPSON, supra note 102, at 85. 
 118. Thompson stated: “[T]he more competent citizens ought to have enough 
influence in politics to protect democracy against the most serious infirmities of rule by 
the less competent and enough to promote the development of competence among all 
citizens.”  Id. at 63. 
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educative benefits of participation partly justify the extension of 
participation, so the educative value of superior competence partly 
justifies the influence of a competent minority.”119  But participation to 
promote competence will not necessarily save the day for one person, 
one vote—particularly in an age of enhancement, with its increased and 
entrenched gulfs in ability, as discussed next. 
bb.  Enhancement and Democratic Governance 
Plural voting is a long way from dictatorship or other autocracy, but it 
is nevertheless likely to be taken as inconsistent with the idea of equality 
of persons as persons.120  One might thus question the seriousness of 
enhancement’s challenge to democracy by recalling that we now 
maintain democratic ideals notwithstanding the present perception of 
very wide interpersonal differences.  A major rationale for maintaining 
the one person, one vote regime is to prevent further consolidations of 
power that leave individuals and groups with inadequate access to basic 
commodities and opportunities. 
But our commitment to democracy—and to various sociopolitical 
conditions that enable democrats to implement their commitment—
might be fragile nonetheless: 
Equality of control is an unstable equilibrium.  Differences in knowledge, skill, 
opportunity and activity create inequalities of control; these in turn tend to 
generate further differences, which create further inequalities.  [Note how this 
may be compounded in still further cycles by enhancement.]  Hence the struggle 
to maintain a polyarchal  organization   [“[t]he main sociopolitical process for 
approximating (although not achieving) democracy . . . .”] is never won; indeed, 
it is always on the verge of being lost.121 
cc.  Enhancement and Participation 
Representative democracy is not just a matter of voting rights and 
voting power, and elections do not confer unreviewable, irreversible 
delegations of authority to representatives or officials.  Ideally, it entails 
 
 119. Id. at 79. 
 120. See Waldron, supra note 108, at 2211–12 (“[A]ccording equal weight or equal 
potential decisiveness to individual votes is a way of respecting persons . . . .  I am not 
saying, however . . . that either fairness or equal respect for persons requires majority 
decision.  John Stuart Mill’s position . . . embodies the possibility that it does not.”) 
 121. ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND 
WELFARE 282, 41 (1976). 
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genuine opportunities for participation in order to promote its underlying 
ideals of autonomy and equality.  The sort of narrowly defined efficiency 
promoted by restricting voting and governing to superior elites is not part 
of the democratic canon.122  But participation is a troublesome concept to 
interpret: There is speaking one’s piece before the appropriate 
representatives and government officials, being able to influence their 
exercises of power, having access to relevant information and ability to 
comprehend it, being a plausible candidate for office as a representative or 
for appointment to public office, and so on.  All these aspects of 
democratic participation may be affected by enhancement, whatever mode 
of distribution of enhancement resources is selected.  One’s greater or 
lesser abilities may expand or contract several critical resources, such as 
audience size, ability to communicate with politically powerful persons 
and groups, relative deliberative skills, capacity to quickly grasp the issues 
of the day, or ultimate influence.  Moreover, in republics we delegate 
responsibility for governing to others, partly from the sheer need for 
division of labor and partly because we want government to be run by 
persons capable of doing so soundly.  To be nonenhanced—that is, to be 
relatively less capable—may be to risk exclusion from government office. 
As suggested, however, the prospect of enhancement may not be fatal 
to egalitarian democracy, either in political theory or in fact.  First, the 
arguments about allocating votes as a function of competence may be 
somewhat misdirected.  Democracy, again, is in part about having a say 
in what affects one.  But as we saw, the degree to which a person is 
affected by some policy or action may have little or no connection to 
her relative competence.  Moreover, to justify plural voting on our 
understanding of democracy, one needs a moral premise concerning the 
proper relationship between one’s political power and one’s particular 
circumstances, including not only one’s competence but one’s 
vulnerabilities to harm (including foregone benefits) under government 
policies.  Within our present political framework, the only such premise 
countenanced for general elections is the one person, one vote formula.  
(There are, as noted, some distinctive electoral processes that do not 
adhere to this standard.)  Representative democracy may contemplate an 
ideal of superbly qualified electors and even more superbly qualified 
representatives, but the ground for democracy is not the superior 
decisionmaking competence of the people and their delegates, as 
opposed to despotic rulers or elites.  It rests generally on the unfairness 
and injustice of impairing autonomy by subjecting people to policies, 
conditions, and interactions that seriously affect them when they do not 
have a voice in the matter, at some important level of choice.  (We 
 
 122. See discussion supra note 87. 
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cannot order the President to cease bombing the principality of Lower 
Paregoric, but we can select the President via the electors for whom we 
vote.)  And the ground for equal-vote democracy, as we saw earlier, 
rests partly on the unfairness of giving unequal power to persons whose 
vulnerabilities are likely to be quite similar, whatever their differing 
mental and physical aptitudes.  Thus, the “equally affected” argument 
may overpower the “superior contribution” argument.  Nevertheless, the 
possibility remains that our current notions of equal vulnerability and 
impact will change as enhancement technologies develop. 
To turn matters around, one might urge that under given 
circumstances it is the enhanced whose participation is at risk, 
particularly if they are a numerical minority.  But even if they are 
endangered by their suspect status, plural voting may not be the best 
mechanism for protecting them as compared with a strong regime of 
individual rights.  Of course, that regime may also be impaired by a 
hostile majority of the nonenhanced. 
Second, egalitarian democracy might survive even within the Millian 
framework because the available enhancements might not be seen as 
affecting competencies relevant to democratic governance.  It is not 
clear, for example, that moral competence, however understood, can be 
affected in any but the most slapdash way by genetic engineering, 
although the possibility of doing so should not be entirely dismissed.123  
Superior competence, in any event, remains a murky concept.  Indeed, as 
Singer observes: 
Mill himself said, later in life, [that plural voting] was a proposal which found 
favour with no one.  The reason, I think, is not that it would obviously be unfair 
to give more votes to better qualified people, but rather that it would be 
impossible to get everyone to agree on who was to have the extra votes.124 
Third, as a matter of theory, it is unclear how a competence criterion 
for ballot power can be assessed entirely independently of certain 
background moral issues concerning, say, the fair, just, or egalitarian 
distribution of goods and services.  With enhancement, the ability gulfs 
between persons may themselves be partially derived from pre-existing 
 
 123. See H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Human Nature Technologically Revisited, 8 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y. 180, 186–89 (1990) (addressing the possibility “that there is a range 
of human antisocial dispositions and inclinations that can be more easily modified 
through genetic engineering than through education or through coercive or instructive 
social structures”).  
 124. PETER SINGER, DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE 34–35 (1973). 
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wealth differences.  Depending on what forms of distribution of 
enhancement resources were in place, these wealth differences would be 
unjustifiably ratified and reified by plural voting.  Because Millian 
competence is empirically tied to wealth, which may be morally 
irrelevant in assigning or recognizing political power, to defend plural 
voting on competence grounds begs some questions of moral evaluation 
concerning distribution and its underlying issues of equality and fairness. 
Fourth, even if technological enhancement did affect relevant forms 
of competence, those who remain unenhanced are not incompetent in 
any sense, including Mill’s.  A loss of relative standing in ability or 
depth of learning does not entail deliberative incompetence.  
Competence, at least for present purposes, arguably concerns attaining a 
certain threshold at least as much as it concerns the distance between 
oneself and others, though the two are connected.  In this respect it is 
similar in structure to personhood.  Here, a Millian might respond that 
enhancement could simply elevate the accepted competence threshold 
for qualifying as a voter, establishing a new minimal baseline for 
competence, but this still would not make the case for supernumerary 
votes. 
Fifth, far from being inconsistent with equal-vote democracy, the 
increasing gaps between persons make it all the more desirable to retain 
that voting system, as suggested earlier.  The less endowed and less 
enhanced are not likely to suspend pursuit of their own interests, despite 
their new relative dimness.  Although the better endowed might be better 
able to protect themselves, given their superiority, a possible result of 
plural voting might be dangerous instabilities, partly because of the 
perceived risk of—and actual—aggrandizement of resources by the 
elites.  The greater the fear of such risks, the more that departure from 
equal voting will be seen as sending us down a steep, greasy slope 
emptying into an abusive oligarchy, run either by the enhanced minority 
or by the unenhanced majority, each fearing domination by the other.  In 
such a world, not only is equality compromised, but so also are all other 
basic values.125 
Turn briefly here from equality to autonomy, a move that will 
shortly return us to equality.  What will become of autonomy if 
enhancement is institutionalized to some degree?  In parallel to the 
dismissal of the respect owed to the less gifted, one might urge that not 
only do they deserve fewer rewards, their autonomy is of lesser worth.  
From contemporary liberal perspectives, however, basic autonomy is not 
tied to one’s measure of abilities, unless it falls below the general 
 
 125. Perhaps awarding extra votes to the nonenhanced would serve as a form of 
redress or prevention for deteriorating equality conditions. 
FINALSHAPIRO.DOC 2/11/2020  2:32 PM 
[VOL. 39:  769, 2002]  Human Equality and Democracy 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 831 
competence threshold, however defined.  Yet, just as we make 
interpersonal comparisons of worth in various senses, we may in fact think 
that autonomy as exercised by different persons may decline in value 
with the declining relative competence of these actors.  This view may 
have still greater pull where enhancement is practiced.  To forestall this 
and protect autonomy for all, perhaps some sort of equal-vote 
democracy is necessary.  As we saw, democracy might remain preferred 
partly because of the posited inequalities, not despite them.  Still, 
defenders of plural voting or rule by an elite are likely to suggest that, 
precisely because of the elite group’s superior competence, autonomy 
and even equality itself are better promoted by what seems like an 
inegalitarian system.126  It is thus hard to deny that participatory-
autonomy values are at elevated risk in an enhancement context. 
Sixth, perhaps the most obvious defense of equal-vote democracy is 
that it may be instrumental in promoting opportunities to obtain the very 
enhancement resources that inspired this debate about democracy’s 
requirements.  This would reflect a continuation of enhancement’s 
potential role in remediation of natural inequalities.  There is certainly 
no assurance that the elites will look out for anyone’s interests but their 
own, except on the doubtful assumption that they will also be moral 
elites with a strong egalitarian or altruistic bent.  It bears mentioning at 
least once in this article, despite the point’s familiarity, that the result of 
superior competence may be greater and more successful evil. 
Finally, plural voting defenders will, sooner or later, make the 
simple-sounding argument that there is no threat to equality in an 
enhancement age.  Equality, after all, concerns the similar treatment of 
similarly situated persons and the dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly 
situated persons.  If the more able are relevantly different from the less 
able, treating them differently is not only consistent with equality, it is 
required by it.  The obvious response, which can only be summarily 
stated here, is that this claim presupposes a large set of contested moral 
propositions concerning the moral relevance of interpersonal differences 
in various attributes. 
 
 
 126. Cf. DAHL, supra note 110, at 88 (“[I]f a superior group of guardians could best 
ensure equal consideration, then it follows that guardianship would definitely be 
desirable, and democracy just as definitely would be undesirable.”).  Strictly, this is of 
course a non sequitur. 
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b.  Social Changes in Attitudes Concerning Equality, Self-Regard,          
and Community: Symbols, Communication, and Learning 
The operation and observation of our social institutions and practices 
generate learning effects.  Present conceptions of equality and other values 
may eventually encounter a changed world where long-standing 
assumptions about the relative stability of traits and character have been 
loosened.  This emergence of a world in which human traits are far more 
controllable than now may, as suggested, drive changes in our attitudes 
about the demands of equality and fairness generally and merit and 
desert in particular.  These shifts in perceived value may occur for 
several reasons.  For example, the consolidation of political power into 
hierarchies—whether or not reflected in plural voting—may result from 
the distribution of enhancement opportunities to those already holding 
wealth and power.  Hierarchical institutions and practices may generate 
self-perpetuating learning effects both on participants and observers.  
The unenhanced may come to perceive their personal attributes and 
social stations as fully locked in, rather than as adjustable or perfectible 
through effort and training.  The availability and practice of 
enhancement may spur an increasingly intense focus on differences in 
traits, thus magnifying their socioeconomic value, with both effects 
reinforcing each other.  True, we might still think that traditional 
enhancement enhances, but that technological enhancement reduces.  
Whether the latter will, within our then-prevailing frameworks, indeed 
reduce persons to the social value of their enhanced traits or elevate 
them in a morally relevant sense is not now predictable. 
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BRIEF 
A.  Constitutional Frameworks 
In the United States, government regulation of use and distribution of 
enhancement technologies must be tested against claims of violating 
implied fundamental liberty interests under the Due Processes Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Federal action must also be 
tested against express and implied limitations on the powers of the 
federal government.  Mention of some constitutional considerations is 
thus called for, and constitutional argument structures are in any event 
useful in discerning and addressing some of the most important issues 
generated by enhancement. 
The right to procreate, as articulated in Skinner v. Oklahoma,127 might 
 
 127. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that an Oklahoma law authorizing 
sterilization of certain habitual offenders but not others violated the Fourteenth 
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be taken to encompass at least certain forms of germ line engineering or 
fetal manipulation, although the strength of such rights is open to serious 
question.  The U.S. Supreme Court may be forced to consider a 
hierarchy of procreational liberty interests, each imposing a greater or 
lesser burden of justification for government regulatory maneuvers.  The 
now widespread practice of prenatal and preconception screening to 
avoid having children with serious disorders is likely to be protected as a 
major adjunct to procreational autonomy.  This might, on some views, 
suggest parallel protection of affirmative intervention to forestall the 
disorders via germ line or fetal alteration and, even more speculatively, 
of germ line augmentation.  Nevertheless, the issue is uncertain, partly 
because of the differences between standard (if technologized) 
reproduction and anticipated future forms: having children at all is not 
the same as having children in certain ways, or of certain (planned) 
sorts.  It is one thing to leave matters to unrevised sexual recombination 
and another to affirmatively determine the traits of a specific individual.  
Important as Skinner is to the constitutional status of procreational 
autonomy, it is far from decisive on these developing issues.128 
Somatic trait augmentation—at least for competent adults—might be 
thought to have greater constitutional protection than parental choice to 
manipulate the germ line or alter fetal development because the altered 
party herself is the decision maker.  Nevertheless, within current 
constitutional frameworks, it seems more difficult to describe the 
constitutional terrain of somatic cell enhancement because there is no 
clear, recognized conceptual bin in which to place it.129  There are no 
precedents establishing broad constitutional liberty or privacy interests 
embracing a right to do what you will with your body, a point noted in 
 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
 128. One might question a distinction between the right to procreate and the right 
raise one’s children by somatic alterations of any sort shortly after birth (or later?).  The 
latter raises some traditional as well as novel issues in parent child decision making.  
Compare In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 824 (N.Y. 1955) (reinstating a children’s court 
ruling that a fourteen-year-old boy should not, at that time, be forced to undergo surgery 
and related treatments for a harelip and cleft palate, given both his and his father’s 
opposition, which apparently was not religiously based), with In re Sampson, 317 
N.Y.S.2d 641, 658 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (upholding a family court order that a fifteen-
year-old boy with disfiguring neurofibromatosis (Von Recklinghausen’s disease) was a 
neglected child and could undergo surgery and receive blood transfusions, if needed, 
over the religious objections of his mother, a Jehovah’s Witness). 
 129. Compare procreational autonomy, which has been much discussed since 
Skinner.  See, e.g., supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
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Roe v. Wade itself.130  There are recognized liberty interests of sorts in 
refusing various forms of medical treatment and in personal security, 
and these interests are likely to extend to forced administration of 
enhancement techniques, medical or nonmedical.  But these doctrines do 
not settle matters of noninterference with voluntary use or of positive 
assistance in securing access. 
Still, at least a colorable case can be made for protecting the decision 
whether to enhance one’s existing merit attributes as an important 
feature of the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; 
it is much too simple to assert that such textually unmentioned rights are 
impossible because no long-standing tradition protects it.  There is in 
fact a tradition of substantially free choice in making use of changing 
methods of instruction, training, and general pedagogy for the purpose, 
among others, of self-improvement.  It might well be thought to extend 
presumptively to control of mental functions and of bodily physiology 
generally, although the perceived differences between technological and 
traditional modes of improvement will be urged in rejecting 
constitutional expansion.131  One might also urge that the liberty interest 
in shaping the nurture and education of one’s children encompasses 
enhancement.  The interpretive maneuvers underlying these constitutional 
arguments are complex and entertaining, but they are described only 
briefly below.  If serious enhancement arrives on the scene, however, 
such arguments are likely to be offered in opposition to restricting access 
to augmentation services. 
Under the logic of constitutional protection of liberty interests, if 
government noninterference with one’s enhancement decisions is 
successfully characterized as invading a fundamental liberty interest, 
governments will have to affirmatively justify their prohibitions and 
other regulations of such choices.  The weight assigned to the liberty 
interest will, in theory, determine how heavy these burdens of 
justification will be.  These varying burdens are captured in different 
standards of review.132  Under heightened scrutiny, government will, at a 
 
 130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
[I]t is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an 
unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases bears a close relationship 
to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court’s decisions.  The 
Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past. 
 131. Because of the logical link between mental functioning and communication, a 
First Amendment argument for a right to use intellectual enhancement resources without 
government interference—as well as the right to refuse such resources—might also be 
crafted.  See Michael H. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: 
Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 256–57 
(1974). 
 132. The nature and structure of constitutional standards of review cannot be 
plumbed here.  See generally Michael H. Shapiro, Constitutional Adjudication and 
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minimum, have to identify serious interests that may be compromised by 
attempted or successful augmentation, for example, avoiding injuries to 
existing or possible persons.  It will also, in theory, have to defend the 
precision of its means for protecting these interests.  Imposing a major 
burden of justification on government action, for whatever reason, is the 
core component of a judicial decision path known as heightened 
scrutiny.  In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized liberty 
interests that apparently draw an intermediate level of scrutiny, rather 
than the maximum strict scrutiny,133 and with technological change it 
may well have to construct still more levels of calibrated protection, if 
not a continuous sliding scale.134 
 
Standards of Review Under Pressure From Biological Technologies, 11 HEALTH 
MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 351 (2001) (outlining the main axes of constitutional interpretation). 
 133. Heightened scrutiny comes in several varieties that are not always so named.  
The most rigorous form is strict scrutiny, requiring governments to establish that their 
intrusions on fundamental liberty interests are necessary to promote compelling state 
interests (or at least those compelling interests in fact relied on by the government in 
enacting and implementing the measures in question).  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 634–36 (1969).  Lesser forms of scrutiny still require a showing that the 
government’s identified interests are important and that the means selected to further 
them are reasonably narrowed so as to promote them without undue impingement on the 
liberty interest, that is, efficiently (in one sense).  See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.5 (1997).  As suggested, the Court 
is not always clear on what standard of review it is using, and it is sometimes 
affirmatively misleading.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has on several occasions 
invoked the language of the minimal rational basis test to strike down classifications it 
thought were particularly unfair to vulnerable groups, without holding that any suspect 
classification or fundamental liberty interest was involved.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional amendment that prohibited 
all governmental action at any level intended to protect gay persons from discrimination, 
and purporting to apply the rational basis test in doing so); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 473 (1985) (striking down a refusal to grant a special use 
permit under local zoning law for a facility housing mentally retarded persons, 
purportedly applying the rational basis test); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) 
(ruling that there was no rational basis for denying a free public education to 
undocumented children).  In a due process context, see Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 
138 (1992) (ruling that a defendant had a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted 
antipsychotic drugs used to render him competent to stand trial, apparently requiring that 
the state demonstrate that compelling concerns outweighed the interest in freedom from 
receiving unwanted antipsychotic drugs, and remanding the case for determination of 
whether there were reasonable alternatives to forced medication).  Justice O’Connor 
denied she applied strict scrutiny.  Id. at 136.  Justice Thomas complained that she had 
indeed improperly done so.  Id. at 156. 
 134. See, e,g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recommending explicit endorsement of a spectrum or 
sliding scale of standards, which he believed was functionally in place already). 
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B.  Paths of Constitutional Interpretation 
It is especially difficult to project future constitutional analysis when 
the human transformations in question seem so far removed from 
traditional paradigms and historical understandings—assuming these 
matters remain constitutionally relevant.  Tradition, history, original 
intentions of various sorts, lexical understandings at the time of framing, 
and the range of the citizenry’s likely understandings continue to be 
viewed as important and perhaps decisive interpretive criteria (separately 
or in some combination) for both explicit and implicit liberty interests.135  
Several cases have been offered as counterexamples to their universal 
and exclusive scope.  Some observers may view these cases with alarm 
or respect or both, as reflecting some sort of judicially independent 
moral evaluation by the Court.136  In any case, those arguing that 
enhancement falls within a strongly protected liberty interest—whether 
as an aspect of procreational liberty, a right of personal development, or 
a right to control our mental and physical functions—will have varying 
difficulties making their case.  If their characterization is rejected by the 
courts, then the government’s burden of justification is very weak—a 
minimal rationality test that generally constrains far less than the use of 
the term “rational” would suggest in everyday language. 
The difficulty in determining the proper constitutional characterization of 
an interest is greatly compounded when the asserted interest reflects an 
innovation that does not seem to fit existing categories.  Thus, determining 
 
 135. In an earlier work, this author elaborated on the nature of interpretation: 
  The main axes of interpretation seem to coalesce into variables dealing 
with characteristics of a text’s author(s) or “senders” (their intentions, 
motivations, and circumstances); with the (generally intersubjective) nature of 
the linguistic or other symbolic entities used to “carry” the message; and with 
the responses of the message’s recipients, based on their own characteristics.  
Other lists of criteria seem to fit within one or more of these larger interpretive 
trails, including temporal variables.  “Tradition,” for example, straddles all of 
them: it might help to determine an author’s understandings and purposes, or 
to fix the lexical meaning of some symbolic entity, or to gauge a recipient’s 
likely understanding of a message.  If another system of abstractions seems 
more illuminating than the preceding three-axis structure, fine; for present 
purposes, this general scheme will do. 
Shapiro, supra note 131, at 356. 
 136. The standard exceptions invoked are Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right 
to abortion), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that 
legally required racial segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection 
Clause).  Whether they are indeed exceptions, and if so to what extent, is much 
discussed.  So also is the question of what theories of constitutional interpretation these 
cases might represent beyond those mentioned in the text.  Some may think that courts 
have been delegated or have assumed the authority to discern which outcomes reflect the 
best interpretation of reigning moral norms, or even of moral principles not (yet?) firmly 
implanted in community sentiment.  For some additional comments and references, see 
generally Shapiro, supra note 131. 
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whether reproductive ventures involving germ line engineering are 
included within a strongly protected liberty interest will, as with any 
form of legal characterization, involve (inter alia) comparisons to 
exemplars of what is or is not protected.  Partisans then characteristically 
state whether the interest proposed for special protection is too far 
removed or distant from the archetype(s).  (This vastly oversimplifies 
huge interpretive issues that cannot be addressed here.)  The problem, 
however, is that the supposedly defining features of the models offered 
may be contested.  Is the process of creating a person who did not exist 
before a sufficient condition for calling the process procreation—either 
in common discourse or in constitutionalese?  Or must the person have 
been created by human sexual recombination rather than asexually?  Or 
must he or she not only be the result of sexual recombination but of 
sexual recombination simpliciter?  In the latter case, we simply rely on 
the genetic lottery and avoid affirmative trait changing, though we might 
use prenatal and preconception screening, possibly followed by abortion 
or nonconception.  The point, for present purposes, is that if we do not 
know what defines the standard example, we cannot always tell how far 
we are from it.  Still, as things stand, prohibiting prenatal, 
preimplantation, or preconception screening would seem to impermissibly 
burden procreational rights by preventing acquisition of critical 
knowledge concerning whether to conceive or abort.  This does not, 
however, show that forbidding germ line alteration, even for enhancement 
rather than disorder prevention, is also impermissible.  One must ask: 
How far is genomic change in persons-to-be, on the one hand, from 
genetic testing in aid of deciding upon abortion or nonconception, on the 
other?  Some may find this a meaningless question, but it may 
nonetheless be a pressing one for purposes of constitutional adjudication.  
Acquisition of genetic knowledge to inform reproductive decisions is a 
constituent of genetic control, but germ line alteration seems to many to 
be vastly different, at least when viewed through prevailing perceptual 
and constitutional frameworks, unfocused though they may be.  When 
biological technologies separate and rearrange life processes in ways not 
contemplated by our existing concepts, the interpretive difficulties we 
already face may be greatly amplified. 
For now, it is enough to say that human procreation has come to 
vary along several overlapping axes, and this greatly complicates the 
task of comparing the cases at hand to exemplars.  These axes 
concern technological facilitation of gamete union (for example, in 
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vitro fertilization); social arrangements (within or outside marriage; 
collaborative, as with surrogacy; use of gamete banks, whether or not 
for eugenic purposes); whether the efforts are asexual (cloning); 
technological mechanisms for trait prediction; and technological 
mechanisms for positive control or influence over traits. 
It seems likely that procreational autonomy extends as a presumptive 
protection—in full or near full strength—to technological facilitation of 
gamete union (subject to limited health and kinship regulations), to 
procreation whether single or married (subject to certain rules for protection 
of marriage and legal parenthood), and to prenatal or preconception 
screening for disorders, defects, or injuries.  This presumptive protection 
might be overcome by compelling or important countervailing interests 
presented by the government.  Broader protection of collaborative 
procreation, and for which participants, is less certain.  There may be 
some coverage for gamete donation or sale (at least for a modest price—
especially for ova—to  avoid charges of “economic coercion”).  The 
constitutional fate of human cloning is seriously in doubt because of the 
common perception that asexual reproduction is a truly radical departure 
from standard procreation and does not belong within protected 
constitutional categories.  Although germ line enhancement within 
sexual reproduction is indeed a striking departure from standard 
reproduction because of its partial nullification of the genetic lottery, it 
seems likelier than cloning to be assigned some serious presumptive 
protection, at least within a disorder model, that is, a justificatory 
scheme based on prevention or control of pathological conditions.  This 
seems especially likely where no specific individual is altered because a 
choice is made among different prospective individuals (embryos or 
even gametes).  Cloning, however, may not go entirely unprotected.  
Even so, the strength of compelling or important governmental interests 
can, in theory, override the individual rights claim, if the regulations are 
carefully tailored to further those interests so as to reduce intrusions on 
constitutionally protected interests. 
C.  Constitutional Equality Standards 
As we saw, there may be questions concerning both the socioeconomic 
and the legal status of the enhanced or the nonenhanced as members of 
discrete, identifiable groups at risk for discrimination and exploitation.  
If so identified, classifications concerning the group might in theory be 
treated as suspect to some degree under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s implied parallel 
protection.  This will again trigger heightened (but perhaps not the most 
rigorous) scrutiny and impose a nontrivial burden of justification on 
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government action.  If this “suspectness” characterization fails, the 
government is likely (but not certain) to prevail.137  The point here is that 
many egalitarian claims find little or no purchase within the 
constitutional framework of equality, which offers strong protection 
against certain forms of discrimination (such as racial, ethnic, and 
gender discrimination), modest protection against certain forms of 
classificational irrationality involving vulnerable groups (it is hard to 
predict which groups will be considered vulnerable),138 and for all 
practical purposes, no protection for any other form of classification.  In 
egregious cases of abuse or manipulative control over enhanced or 
unenhanced persons, however, one might claim violation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment (banning slavery) or the Nobility Clause.139  
Both provisions are heavily inspired by considerations of equality. 
D.  Congressional Powers 
Congress has an uncertain range of powers to promote constitutional 
rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (and parallel 
provisions in other amendments).  If any group—nonenhanced or 
enhanced—seems especially put upon, Congress might consider 
remedial legislation.140  Such legislation might further rights to use and 
to avoid enhancement resources and could include forms of  affirmative 
action for the have-nots.  Congress also retains considerable powers to 
protect or promote constitutional rights under the Commerce Clause and 
the taxing and spending powers.  Some recent Supreme Court decisions, 
however, suggest that congressional powers under Section 5 and under 
the Commerce Clause are not quite as expansive as might have been 
thought.141 
 
 137. See discussion supra note 133 (mentioning cases in which the Court struck 
down certain nonsuspect classifications, relying on what it called the rational basis test). 
 138. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 473. 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see Francis C. Pizzulli, Asexual Reproduction and 
Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 476, 516–17 (1974). 
 140. On this and related constitutional issues, see Attanasio, supra note 61. 
 141. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (striking down law 
penalizing firearms possession in a school zone as exceeding Congress’s power under 
the Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) 
(invalidating the Violence Against Women Act because it exceeded Congress’s powers 
under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act as exceeding Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
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VI.  FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 
A brief note on this symposium’s inspiration, From Chance to Choice: 
Genetics and Justice.142  These suggestions are not a true critique and in 
some ways are matters of taste—aesthetic or otherwise.143  Nevertheless, 
they do concern some matters of central concern in pursuing a basic-
values-oriented study of likely technological developments in genetics, 
so this Article sets them out before concluding. 
First, there is little attention given to the concepts of merit and desert.  
Some commentary on them would have been welcome because, within 
existing moral and political standpoints, they are key ascriptions in the 
distribution of scarce resources (including intangibles such as respect) 
and are heavily involved, even if not explicitly, in moral, legal, and 
economic analysis.  As such, one can rightly wonder what roles they will 
play, if any, either in their present forms or as reconstructed (though 
such reconstruction might obliterate them).  A related topic concerns the 
moral status of virtue.  
Second, the concept of justice is linked in complex ways to other basic 
values—including fairness, autonomy, and equality.  Thus, the authors’ 
work is necessarily, in part, a commentary on these other basic values.  
Because the focus in the present essay was on equality, this Article looks 
for a somewhat clearer and more systematic acknowledgement and 
illustration of the contested nature of that concept, and thus, to an extent, 
of justice.  Of course, no basic moral, philosophical, and legal abstractions 
are fully determinate and specifiable.  Equality, however, has some 
distinct properties that need to be brought out.  For example, one often 
runs out of guidance from equality fairly quickly and a move to other 
sources of moral and legal value becomes necessary.  This is an aspect of 
the emptiness sometimes attributed to equality.  Another consideration is 
that wildly different forms of equality are with us from the very start, and 
this may stop us cold somewhat more quickly than when we confront 
other difficult abstractions.   
Third, the shift from chance to choice is central to the possibility that 
the ideal of forming noncontingent bonds of duty and affection between 
persons—particularly between children and their parents (or other 
caregivers)—may wither.  This idea of noncontingent bonding in turn is 
 
Amendment).  On Eleventh Amendment constraints, see generally HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. 
& ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.35 (2001). 
 142. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1. 
 143. Wellington noted the possible aesthetic component in some matters of legal 
doctrine.  See Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and “Governmental 
Action,” 70 Yale L.J. 345, 348 (1961) (suggesting the possibility of “an aesthetic and 
emotional appeal” to the view that unions and corporations should be subject to 
constitutional constraints because of their supposed similarities to government). 
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a critical aspect of concepts of moral and legal appraisal in increasingly 
wide use.  These include the idea of personhood; the question of how we 
perceive both threshold personhood and particular persons, and how we 
positively value them or, on the other hand, reduce them; and the role of 
the Kantian injunction against mere use of persons as means.144  These 
notions were certainly tended to in From Chance to Choice, but a more 
extended account of their basic aspects would also have been welcome. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Dealing with technological enhancement and its impact on basic values 
is beset with the usual overlapping problems of value analysis—
vagueness, ambiguity, open texture, indeterminacy, and collision with 
other values.  But these problems are aggravated because the new powers 
to enhance seem to undermine assumptions concerning our understanding 
of these values—assumptions that arguably provided some direction.  
Moral and legal evaluation of enhancement technologies requires 
determining just how crucial these assumptions are. 
The most obvious assumption being tested, of course, is that we are 
severely limited in altering native traits, including our most valued 
merit attributes and resource attractors, by the constraints of our 
individual genetic endowments and by the very nature of the more 
familiar and slow-working tools of self-improvement: study, training, 
practice, effort, and self-discipline. 
It now appears, however, that technological intervention via the germ 
line and somatic mechanisms will eventually allow us to alter, at least in 
certain ways, the limits of what we now view as relatively fixed 
potentials for gradual improvement.  Today, with extended study and 
practice as he grows up, a person with Forrest Gump’s combination of 
assets and disadvantages can learn to make change, to balance checking 
accounts, and perhaps even to do some algebra, but quantum gravity will 
forever elude him, and most of the rest of us.  Later, perhaps such limits 
will be weakened—evidence of the possibility of serious and accelerated 
trait changes seems to be growing.  It thus seems prudent to consider 
whether one’s merit, virtue, and ultimate desert rest only on traditional 
paths toward personal progress; whether these decision making criteria 
 
 144. For discussion of these ideas, see generally Michael H. Shapiro, I Want a Girl 
(Boy) Just Like the Girl (Boy) That Married Dear Old Dad (Mom): Cloning Lives, 9 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1999). 
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will even be manageable within our technologically altered situation; 
and how we ought to—and will—apply basic moral and legal modes of 
thought. 
 
 
